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THE CHANGING ROLE
OF THE
SOVIET NAVY

Government 259
Harvard University
Professor Henry A. Kissinger

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PREFACE

The Soviet Navy has traditionally been treated in Soviet strategic thought as a kind of seaward extension of Russia's land forces. In one of his World War II declarations, Stalin described the Soviet Fleet as "the true helper of the Red Army."¹ This Soviet concept of the Navy as a kind of floating Army Auxiliary tended until very recently to keep Soviet naval surface forces close to Russian shores and clear of the high seas. In the period of the 1950's, Soviet naval strategy was clearly defensive, and the overriding concern of Soviet naval leaders was the protection of the Soviet Union from possible nuclear attack by American carrier task forces.

In recent years, Soviet naval vessels have been appearing more frequently in the world's sea lanes, most noticeably in the Mediterranean Sea. Last year, for the first time, Soviet naval warships were deployed in a highly visible manner in an attempt to influence events in the Middle East during the Arab-Israeli war. More recently, Soviet naval units were dispatched to the vicinity of the U.S. naval task force off the coast of Korea during the Pueblo crisis. These and other developments have led some observers to conclude that the Soviet Navy has been given the mission

1. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 362.

of projecting Soviet power abroad into areas not contiguous to the Soviet Union, in a Communist version of "gun-boat diplomacy".

In a statement representative of the journalistic reaction to the greater visibility of Soviet naval power, Time magazine commented:

The new Soviet emphasis on seapower represents a major strategic decision. With its arsenal of 720 ICBMs more than offset by a larger U.S. deterrent, with its huge land army muscle-bound and deprived of global mobility in the middle of the great Eurasian land mass, Russia has turned to the sea to break out of its own geographic confines and attempt to wield truly global power.²

In general, this evaluation seems to correspond to the fears of many naval observers in the United States.³

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the missions of the Soviet Navy as they appear to be unfolding in the 1960's, with particular emphasis on the capabilities and limitations of Soviet naval power for use in limited applications of force or influence abroad. This analysis is based on an examination of the public statements of Soviet leaders regarding the potentialities of seapower and military force in general, an examination of the physical capabilities and limitations of the Soviet naval forces as they exist,

2. Time, February 23, 1968, p. 23.

3. "Navy, Seeking Funds, Notes Soviet Gains", New York Times, February 21, 1968.

and an examination of the actual uses which have been made of the Soviet Navy in recent years.

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CHAPTER ONE: WARSHIPS OF THE SOVIET NAVY

In the Navy, the submarine gains in importance, whereas surface ships can no longer play the role they played in the past.

- N. S. Khrushchev¹

It is a truism that a nation's military strategy is reflected in the weapons it procures. This is perhaps even more true in the case of naval strategy than in other branches because of the great expense of naval construction and the long useful life of naval vessels. Even though combatant ships tend to be multi-purpose weapons, they are not infinitely so. The inherent capabilities and limitations of naval vessels procured in the present will tend to determine the options open to naval strategists for at least a decade into the future, and perhaps longer. For this reason, any examination of Soviet naval strategy must take into account the naval shipbuilding program.

Khrushchev opened the decade of the 1960's with a major speech on the military balance, in which he deprecated the role of the surface ship and indicated that priority was to be given to submarine construction. Soviet naval approval of this course of action was officially expressed by Admiral V. A. Kasatonov, then commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and a former submarine commander.² Actually, Khrushchev's aversion to major surface

1. Report to the Supreme Soviet, "Disarmament - the way to secure peace and friendship between nations", Pravda, January 15, 1960.

2. Pravda, January 16, 1960.

warships had long been known. After Admiral Sergei Gorshkov relieved Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov as head of the Soviet Navy in 1957, construction was halted on the Sverdlov-class cruiser program initiated under Stalin's regime, with only 15 out of a projected 24 cruisers completed.³ This postwar cruiser construction program represented a major allocation of resources to the Soviet surface Navy, and the cancellation of the program indicated a major change in Soviet thinking on the role of the Navy in future warfare.

The postwar Soviet cruiser construction program is a rather curious development in many respects. The Sverdlov class cruiser is a modern design, comparable to cruiser designs developed in the United States during World War II, such as the Fargo class of light cruisers. Its usefulness is severely limited, however, by certain design features. In the first place, the anti-aircraft armament of the Sverdlov class is weak, even by the standards of World War II, and in any case would have been of doubtful usefulness against the high-speed jet aircraft of the 1950's. The experience of World War II naval operations pointed out the extreme vulnerability of surface vessels to air power in the absence of air superiority. This meant that the Sverdlov class cruiser could not be effectively utilized beyond the range of Soviet interceptor aircraft operating from Soviet airbases. The class was further limited by an operating radius of 4,000 to 5,000 miles. Since the Soviet Navy in the 1950's did

3. Actually, 20 Sverdlov class hulls were launched, and 15 completed. In 1962, one of these was transferred to Indonesia. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1962-63 (London, Samson Low & Co., 1962)

not have the capability of refueling naval units at sea, this characteristic alone restricted the operations of this type cruiser in times of war to an area within a short distance of the Soviet coastline. These characteristics, coupled with the Soviet view of the Navy as a floating auxiliary of the Red Army, suggest that the Sverdlov class cruiser was designed for a defensive role against American carrier strike forces and amphibious assault task forces directed at the Soviet Union. Given the tremendous air power of a carrier task force and the fact that U.S. doctrine does not contemplate attempting an amphibious assault without first establishing local air superiority, it is difficult to contemplate the circumstances under which a Sverdlov class cruiser would be able to approach an American task force close enough to take it under fire with its six-inch guns (i.e., less than 15 miles).

The intriguing question here is not why the cruiser program was terminated, but rather why it was ever begun in the first place. If Soviet production costs are in any way comparable to American costs for similar equipment, the Sverdlov program represented an investment on the order of three billion dollars over a period of six years. This expense was undertaken at a time when the Soviet economy was being sorely taxed in an effort to reconstruct the terrible damage of World War II, to develop thermonuclear weapons, and to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles for their delivery. The answer is probably to be found within the framework of bureaucratic politics in the Soviet Union.

There is reason to suspect that a strong factor supporting

the cruiser construction program was the factor of prestige. If great naval powers have cruisers and the Soviet Union planned to become a great naval power, then the Soviet Union must have cruisers. This was hinted by Admiral Kasatonov in his statement on Khrushchev's January 1960 speech. Kasatonov said, "the classes of major surface ships, with which ideas of the might of the fleet were connected until recent times, have lost their former significance."⁴

It is also interesting to note that the cruiser program coincides almost exactly with the period when the Soviet Navy last operated autonomously under its own ministry. In 1950, the Navy was placed under the Ministry of the Navy, headed by Fleet Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, a wartime naval leader, and one of the few top-ranking participants in the mission to assist the Spanish Republic who survived the purges of 1938. The cruiser construction program began in 1951. Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the Navy was again placed under the Ministry of Defence. Kuznetsov continued to fight for a large Navy, but was relieved of his command in late 1955 or early 1956. The fact that the cruiser program was terminated almost immediately following his relief indicates that the program was dependent upon Kuznetsov's support for its continuation. It seems likely that this is one of the disputes that led to his downfall. The submarine program, however, which was also begun under Kuznetsov's ministry, obviously had support from other quarters, since it

4. Pravda, January 16, 1960 (emphasis mine).

was not terminated.

Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, the young Soviet Admiral who replaced Kuznetsov as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy in 1956 at the age of 46, probably owes much of his success to the good fortune of serving with the Black Sea Fleet during World War II. During the course of the war, he had occasion to work with senior military and civilian officials of the Stalingrad front during various supporting operations. This is the famous "Stalingrad group" which Khrushchev eventually appointed to high positions in the military hierarchy, and which enjoys its preeminent position to this day.⁵ Khrushchev apparently took the opportunity provided by Kuznetsov's dispute with the Army to place one of his own proteges in the commanding position in the Navy.

This is the last time that Soviet politics had such an obvious relationship with naval appropriations. Gorshkov apparently approved of the emphasis on the submarine program as well as the emphasis on missiles, both under Khrushchev and Khrushchev's successors. Soviet naval leadership has remained remarkably stable since 1956. The only upward mobility into the hierarchy was occasioned by the death of Admiral Arsenii Golovko, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief (who accompanied Gorshkov into office in 1956) in May, 1962, and the death of his successors, Admiral Vitalii Fokin, in January, 1964 and Admiral F. V. Zozulya in April, 1964. The current First Deputy, Vladimir Afanasievich Kasatonov, was promoted to Fleet Admiral, the highest rank in the

5. A good account of the Stalingrad Group is to be found in Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967).

Soviet Navy, in 1965. The death of each First Deputy, of course, brought about a reshuffling of the Naval hierarchy, but from the data available, no conclusions can be drawn as to the effect of such reassignments of Soviet Naval doctrine.

The Soviet emphasis on the submarine is not new in Russian naval thought. The Tsarist Navy showed more interest in the submarine than did the large naval powers. The 1912 building program planned for the construction of 36 submarines by 1930 for the Baltic Fleet alone. This was even before the German use of the submarine with such devastating effect in World War I had demonstrated the potentialities of the submarine. With the first five-year plan of 1928, the Soviet Navy embarked on a massive submarine construction program, and by the beginning of the war in 1941 had 250 submarines in operation, of which 245 had been built since 1928. This rapid expansion of the submarine force led to certain understandable shortcomings in training and readiness, however, and the Soviet submarine force never performed very well against the Germans during World War II.

The submarine construction program of the 1950's concentrated on the W-class submarine, a conventional ocean-going submarine roughly comparable to the American Guppy-II submarine.⁶ The R-class, of which 12 were built between 1959 and 1962, is an improved version of the W-class, apparently with an expanded antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. The Z-class, a larger

6. The data set forth in this Chapter on Soviet warships is derived primarily from the German naval annual, Weyers Flotten-taschenbuch, Jane's Fighting Ships, and the Institute for Strategic Studies annual report, The Strategic Balance. This data is tabulated in Tables I-IV.

boat than the W, with a greater range and more torpedo tubes, was built in more limited numbers. The F-class, begun in 1959, is an improved version of the Z-class, again with what appears to be an improved ASW capability. All of these classes are versatile submarines, capable of being utilized in an ASW role as well as for commerce-destroying and anti-task force operations. Their usefulness under modern conditions of warfare is limited by the fact that they are armed solely with torpedoes and mines, and by the necessity to periodically operate their diesel engines to recharge batteries.

Sometime in 1958, in reaction to the American Polaris program, the Soviet Navy began to develop submarines with an entirely new role: the ballistic-missile submarine. There were two classes involved in the original ballistic missile submarine effort: the G class, which was newly constructed from the keel up, and a conversion of the Z class submarine. Both are conventionally powered submarines. The Z conversion carries two Sark ballistic missiles in the sail, and the G class is equipped with three Sark missiles with a range estimated at 870 nautical miles. About 1961, construction of a nuclear-powered class of ballistic missile submarines, the H class, was undertaken. The H class is similar in appearance to the G class, and carries three ballistic missiles in the sail. Originally these were Sark missiles, but sometime in 1962 a program of backfitting the Serb missile into the H class was begun. The Serb missile is estimated to have a slightly greater range and is capable of submerged firing. According to the Soviet press, Chairman Khrushchev witnessed a submerged fir-

ing of a ballistic missile, probably a Serb missile, during his visit to the Northern Fleet in July, 1962.⁷

Having set out on a program of emulation of the Polaris submarine, the next step was to attempt to find some means of countering it. The problem of antisubmarine warfare was discussed extensively in the press, and here again the emphasis seemed to be on the submarine. One Soviet Naval officer, Captain(1st Rank) Kvitnitskii, commented: "In the opinion of western naval specialists, under contemporary conditions of warfare at sea, the most effective means for search and destruction of submarines is the hunter-killer submarine".⁸ The tenor of Kvitnitskii's article left no doubt that he agreed with this "western" opinion. Other articles on ASW written about the same time tended to support the idea of relying on the submarine for ASW purposes.

Once the problem of antisubmarine warfare began to be associated with ballistic missile submarines, the idea of anti-anti-submarine warfare began to appear. Although the idea was publically attributed to "American military authorities", it seems that the idea of providing ballistic missile submarines with an ASW screen of nuclear powered submarines was discussed.⁹

Two new classes of submarine, both with apparently improved sonar installations, probably designed for ASW work, made

7. Krasnaya Zvezda, September 28, 1962.

8. Captain(1st Rank)A. Kvitnitskii, "In Conditions of a Military Psychosis: Antisubmarine Measures in the American Navy", Krasnaya Zvezda, September 26, 1961.

9. Captain(1st Rank)I. Potapov, "Doctrine and the Fleet", Krasnaya Zvezda, September 26, 1962.

their appearance in 1959. These were the R and F classes, previously described. The following year saw the introduction of the prototype of a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine, the N class. An early submarine of this class, the Leninskii Komsomolets, made a cruise under the Arctic ice cap to the North pole in the summer of 1962. The submarine was met by Khrushchev on its return, and the commanding officer, engineering officer, and the Admiral in charge were awarded the rank of "hero of the Soviet Union" for the feat, although Captain(2nd Rank) Zhil'tsov, the commanding officer of the Leninskii Komsomolets described the feat as an everyday affair.¹⁰ This class of submarine is probably armed with nuclear-tipped homing torpedos.¹¹

A somewhat different line of submarine development was undertaken in 1959, when a number of W class submarines were converted to fire Shaddock surface-to-surface(SSM) air breathing or "cruise" missiles. These missiles, with a range of about 300 miles and a speed on the order of mach 2.5, are described in the Soviet press as homing (samonavodiashchii or "self guiding") missiles. They are probably intended as a stand-off weapon against carrier task forces. In 1962 a conventionally-powered submarine, the J class, first appeared, which was designed from the keel up to carry Shaddock missiles. The same year saw the introduction of a nuclear-powered submarine, the E

10. "Slava Sovetskim Podvodnikom", Krasnaya Zvezda, Jan.20,1963.

11. Boevoi Put'Soveskogo Voennno-Morskogo Flota (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 398.

class, designed for the same purpose. The latter type has appeared in two versions. The original "E-1" class carries six missiles and two torpedo tubes, while the "E-2" class which first appeared in 1964 is equipped with eight missiles and six tubes.

An examination of the submarine construction program of the last decade thus suggests the expected role of the Soviet submarine. The G, H, and Z-conversion classes have a strategic ballistic missile capability and a role similar to that of the U.S. Polaris submarines. The R, F, and N classes, although they are certainly capable of a commerce-raiding role, appear to be intended primarily for antisubmarine warfare, with an emphasis on countering the Polaris submarine. The W-conversion, J, and E classes, although probably capable of bringing shore targets under fire with their cruise missiles, appear to have the primary role of countering American carrier task forces. As we shall see, this fits in well with the Soviet preoccupation with the initial period of a thermonuclear war. The antisubmarine submarines and the cruise-missile submarines can then be thought of as having what is essentially a "counterforce" role in nuclear war.

In this connection, an examination of the numbers of submarines constructed since 1958 should give some indication of the relative importance attached to the counterforce role by the Soviet naval leadership. Out of 118 submarines constructed in the Soviet Union in the past decade, 26 are of the W-conversion, J, and E classes with a counterforce role against carrier

task forces; 47 are of the R, F, and N classes, with an ASW role; and 45 are Z-conversion, G, and H class ballistic-missile submarines. Of these, about ten submarines of each group are nuclear-powered. Thus, in the submarine program, about two-thirds of the effort has been dedicated to building a counterforce capability. Such a priority receives further confirmation from a 1962 speech of Soviet Defense Minister, R. Ya. Malinovsky: "The Soviet Navy, the basic armament of which is the submarine, equipped with atomic engines, missiles, and homing torpedoes with nuclear warheads, has received the capability of waging effective battle with the fleet of the enemy at the distant approaches to our shores."¹²

In view of the counterforce problem presented by the difficulties of detection and destruction of ballistic missile submarines, it is interesting to compare the Polaris program with the Soviet program. Since each Polaris submarine carries 16 missiles, the U.S. program enjoys a commanding lead in terms of missiles deployed: 656 to 125. Since the Russian submarines carry either two or three missiles each, on the other hand, they have the lead in the number of submarines deployed, 45 to 41. The United States program has undoubtedly achieved large economies of scale by concentrating so many missiles in each submarine. The Soviet Union, however, has achieved greater dispersal by deploying a much smaller number of missiles in each hull. Thus, in terms of striking power, each Polaris submarine is worth at least five Soviet missile

12. Fleet Admiral I. S. Isakov, "American Falsifiers of Naval History ", Krasnaya Zvezda, August 11, 1962.

submarines, but United States antisubmarine forces must locate and destroy five Soviet submarines to accomplish the same results that the Soviets would achieve by locating and destroying one Polaris submarine.¹³

Although Khrushchev declared in 1960 that large surface ships had lost their former significance, this did not mean that construction of surface ships was to cease entirely. Beginning about 1957, however, the character of Soviet surface ships changed significantly. About the same time that the Sverdlov class of cruisers was being constructed, Soviet shipyards were also turning out large numbers of modern destroyers. The standard postwar design was the Skory class, built from 1949 to 1954. These ships, of which about 75 were completed, were of fairly standard design, corresponding roughly to the British Daring class and the American Forrest Sherman class of the same vintage. These destroyers all differed little from the standard designs of World War II. In 1954, the Russians shifted to production of the Kotlin class, somewhat larger than the Skory, and with slightly improved ASW armament.

In 1957, there appeared the first Soviet destroyer equipped to fire missiles. This was the Kildin class, which was equipped with a single launcher aft for the Strela surface to surface missile(SSM) with a range of about 50 miles. This class was seriously deficient in anti-aircraft armament, as it had only 45 mm guns for this purpose. The Kildin class was con-

13. This is not meant to imply that one concept is necessarily better than the other, but it is illustrative of the problems of comparing relative naval power.

structed on the same hull as the Kotlin class. About four of these vessels were constructed. The following year, one Kotlin class destroyer had its after gun battery replaced with a single launcher for the Goa surface-to-air missile(SAM), but this type was never placed into serial production.

The first guided missile destroyer designed from the keel up appeared in 1958. This class, the Krupny class, was somewhat larger than the Kildin and Kotlin classes, and carried two Strela SSM launchers, one forward and one aft. This class, too, was highly deficient in antiaircraft defense. The Krupny class and all classes of Soviet destroyer type ships built since that time are referred to in the Soviet press as "missile cruisers", although they are in fact somewhat smaller than the American guided missile destroyer leaders(DLG). It is estimated that 8-10 Krupny class destroyers have been built to date.

In June of 1960, less than six months after Khrushchev's disarmament speech, the keel was laid for the prototype of yet another class of "missile cruisers", the Kynda class. The Kynda class was the first Soviet surface vessel to be armed with the 300-mile Shaddock missile, which had previously appeared on submarines. The Kynda carries 8 Shaddock missiles in two four-tube launchers, and is equipped with one Goa SAM launcher forward, in addition to four 75-mm guns. This gave the Kynda the most formidable antiaircraft capability of any Soviet destroyer yet built, in addition to a formidable surface-to-surface missile battery and a respectable ASW capability.

In 1962, the Kashin class of destroyers appeared. Somewhat

smaller than the Kynda class, the Kashin's main armament consists of two Goa SAM launchers(one forward and one aft), two twin-75mm guns(one forward and one aft), and four ASW rocket launchers (two more than Kynda). This type ship, in contrast to the Kynda, Krupny, and Kildin, had almost no surface-to-surface capability, but a much improved AAW capability. This class, of which about six have been constructed, could be described as a dual-purpose destroyer, designed for AAW and ASW.

The most recent destroyer type, the Kresta class, which appeared in 1965, is similar in many respects to the Kynda class, but has an improved AAW capability. It is equipped with two Shaddock SSM launchers, two Goa SAM launchers, four 57-mm antiaircraft guns, four ASW launchers, and a helicopter, which is probably equipped for ASW purposes. This ship design, judging from the installed armament, is intended to be a truly multiple-purpose destroyer.

All of the approximately 30 Soviet destroyers built since 1957 have been equipped with guided missiles, and only about six have not been equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. Although these SSM's are probably capable of being used against shore targets, they are primarily designed as anti-shipping missiles. The evidence suggests that, just as in the case of J, W-conversion, and E class submarines, the primary intended function of these destroyers was to counter an attack by American carrier task forces. The first two of these classes were practically devoid of antiaircraft defense. This was initially dictated by space and weight considerations but it must have occurred to the

Soviet designers after their initial efforts in this field that these ships were extremely vulnerable to carrier aviation, the main armament of the class of ship they were designed to attack. This situation was largely remedied with the construction of the Kynda class, and the purpose of the Kashin class may very well have been to provide AAW protection for the previously constructed missile ships. The Kresta class is even more heavily protected than the Kynda class.

The destroyer construction program, then, seems to confirm the counterforce orientation of Soviet naval thought. It must be conceded that these ships would be capable of inflicting considerable damage on carrier attack forces in the event of an all-out nuclear war in which American and NATO aircraft carriers attempted to play a strategic role. They could at least raise the entry price of such a utilization of American sea power.

In terms of limited warfare, however, the newer Soviet destroyers would be considerably less useful than the older Skory class and Kotlin class destroyers for such applications as gunfire support for troops ashore, interdiction of supply lines ashore, and other similar applications of naval gunnery. For such applications, the Kresta class, for instance, is about as well armed as the 1,000 ton destroyer escorts of the Mirka and Riga classes. Since 1962, the Soviet capability for such operations has actually declined, due to the breaking up for scrap and sale to other navies of about 20 Skory class destroyers.

The counterforce capability of the Soviet surface Navy

has been enhanced since 1961 by the addition of about 100 guided-missile gunboats of the Osa and Komar classes armed with Styx surface-to-surface guided missiles. These boats appear to be designed for operations close to shore, probably to counter any possible amphibious assault. Their effectiveness was dramatically demonstrated last October when the Egyptian Navy used one of their Komar class boats to sink the Israeli destroyer Elath from a distance of about 13 miles.

The Soviet Union has never had an aircraft carrier. The Russian armies did capture the scuttled hulk of the partially completed German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin at Stettin on the Baltic in April, 1945.¹⁴ The ship later struck a mine at sea while being towed to the Soviet Union and was either lost at sea or broken up for scrap at Leningrad. In any event the German carrier would not have served as a satisfactory prototype for a Soviet carrier program, even if it had arrived in Leningrad intact. The German designers had no experience with aircraft carriers and had based their design on exterior details of contemporary naval designs as described in naval manuals such as Jane's Fighting Ships. The Graf Zeppelin never became operational.

Although there are indications from time to time of Soviet interest in aircraft carriers, the cost of such a program has apparently acted to move their naval construction effort in other directions. Soviet Naval aviation is entirely land-based,

14. Clark G. Reynolds, "Hitler's Flattop - The End of the Beginning", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 93, no. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 41-49.

with the exception of a few helicopters operating from various ships. The main force of Soviet naval aviation has consisted of Tu-16 Badger aircraft, many of which are equipped with Kennel air-to-surface missiles with a range of about 90 miles. They have more recently acquired a number of Tu-95 Bear turbo-prop long range aircraft modified for reconnaissance purposes. These planes evidently have a mission of countering carrier task forces.

Another large portion of Soviet naval aviation is dedicated to antisubmarine warfare. In the past, the workhorse in this area was the Madge flying boat, but this aircraft has recently been supplemented by a shore-based fixed wing aircraft similar to our P-3A Orion, and by Hound antisubmarine helicopters. Some of these helicopters have operated from the Kresta and certain Krupny class destroyers which have been fitted with helicopter platform on the stern.

The most recent development in Soviet naval aviation is the recent construction of two helicopter aircraft carriers.¹⁵ It is not yet known for what purpose these vessels were constructed. In the past, Soviet writers have shown some interest in the use of helicopter carriers for antisubmarine purposes.¹⁶ At the same time, they have also followed the development of helicopter

15. New York Times, October 23, 1967.

16. See, for example, Captin(1st Rank) Potapov, "Avianostsy ili Podlodky" ("Aircraft Carriers or Submarines"), Krasnaya Zvezda, July 6, 1960. In this article Captain Potapov erroneously attributed the United States Navy with having 21 ASW helicopter carriers. Also, see G. M. Trusov, Podvodnye Lodki v Russkom i Sovetskom Flote (Submarines in the Russian and Soviet Navy), (Leningrad, Sudpromizdat, 1963), p. 416. Trusov proposes carrying ASW helicopters on special helicopter carriers or "ordinary transports".

carriers in the United States and other western countries for amphibious assault purposes.¹⁷ The use of such a carrier for antisubmarine warfare would fit in well with the apparent counterforce orientation of the Soviet fleet. If these vessels turn out to be intended for amphibious warfare, it would indeed signify a dramatic change in Soviet thinking on the role of the Navy.

Since World War II, the Soviet Navy has maintained a modest capability for the conduct of amphibious warfare. The Soviet army receives regular training in amphibious warfare, largely oriented toward river and lake-crossing efforts. The Navy has maintained a small number of amphibious landing ships, similar in appearance to the United States LST, but much smaller. By the most recent account, the Soviet Union has about 24 of these vessels,¹⁸ each of which can carry from eight to ten tanks (compared to about 40 for the latest U.S. LST's). The Soviet Navy has no large amphibious transports or assault cargo ships, no landing ship docks or assault helicopter carriers (unless the most recent additions to the fleet turn out to have this purpose), such as are maintained by the United States. The Soviet amphibious lift capability, then, would have to be rated as very modest. In the summer of 1967, a few Soviet landing ships of a new class (NATO designation: Alligator) appeared for the first time in the Mediterranean. These ships are much larger

17. Ibid., also Captain (3rd Rank) Dudko, "Zaryas' na Chuzhie Berega", Krasnaya Zvezda, September 10, 1961, and Captain (2nd Rank) Belashchenko, "Pod Flagom Razboya i Agressii", Krasnaya Zvezda, January 28, 1962.

18. L. W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (London: Chatto and Windbus, 1967), p. 179.

than the previous landing ships, and compare favorably with the U.S. LST. It is not known how many of these are in commission.

In 1964, before the replacement of Khrushchev, the Soviet Navy reactivated a small marine force, or "Naval Infantry". This force has since grown to about 6,000 troops divided among the four fleets of the Soviet Navy. In organization and training, they would appear to be closer in pattern to the French Naval Infantry than to the United States Marine Corps. Such a small force, in any event, would be suitable only for commando type operations. During World War II, the Soviet Naval Infantry took part in several amphibious operations. In the larger ones, they operated as the spearhead for establishing a beachhead, and then were replaced by larger Army forces. This experience probably forms the basis for their present training and organization.

No Navy can operate away from its own shores for extensive periods of time without means for replenishing fuel, provisions, and ammunition, obtaining necessary spare parts, and having access to repair facilities in the event of an emergency. The United States Navy has the use of an extensive global network of bases with large supplies of stores and spare parts and complete repair facilities. In addition to this, the highly developed art of underway replenishment of fuel and provisions, based on a well-designed and well-trained fleet of auxiliary vessels enables the United States to support large task forces at sea independent of shore bases for months at a time. From the time

that the Soviet Union first started granting economic and military aid to countries outside the "socialist camp", there have been persistent rumors of the imminent creation of such a system of land bases for the Soviet Navy. To date, these rumors have proven unfounded. The current use of Alexandria and other Egyptian ports by Soviet naval vessels is as close to the establishment of a base as the Russians have ever come. The facilities enjoyed by the Russians in Egypt, however, are far from equivalent to those enjoyed by the United States in Japan and the Philippines, by the British in Singapore, or by the French in Algeria.

The Russians have relied for logistical support largely on a fleet of tenders which they call "floating bases" (plavuchaya baza), and tankers. The art of underway replenishment at sea is not very well developed in the Soviet Navy. In the Mediterranean, the tankers and tenders have made use of anchorage areas located in international waters. In these anchorages, Soviet naval vessels needing replenishment moor alongside the tenders or anchor and transfer provisions by small boat. Such a procedure would render the fleet highly vulnerable in time of war. About 1961, a few tankers were equipped with the equipment necessary for underway replenishment alongside, and the Navy has begun to develop experience in such operations. These new replenishment rigs are similar to the "close-in" rigs used by some American carriers to refuel destroyers, and are not satisfactory for use in heavy weather conditions. All in all, the Soviet Navy has a long way to go before it will achieve the logistical mo-

bility of the American Navy.

In his speech before the Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April, 1966, Soviet Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovsky gave an unusually large amount of attention to the development of the Soviet Navy. In one section of the speech devoted to the defensive nature of the Soviet armed forces, he commented enigmatically, "We calmly and confidently stand in defense of the peaceful labor of our people, the more so now, when the creation of the Blue Belt for Defense of our country has been completed".¹⁹ Some light on this "Blue Belt" was shed in May when East German Defense Minister General Heinz Hoffman spoke to the East Berlin border guards of "the atomic submarines of the Blue Defense Belt, which can operate in every sea in the world". It seems clear from this that the "Blue Belt" is associated with nuclear-powered submarines.

It is possible that the "Blue Belt for Defense" is a euphemistic reference to the fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Malinovsky's statement that the Belt is "completed" (zavershon) may mean simply that it is operational. The most recent estimates of both the Institute for Strategic Studies and Jane's Fighting Ships indicate that construction of nuclear ballistic missile submarines was halted in 1966. The ISS estimate indicates that new construction has consisted of N class submarines, where Jane's estimate indicates that it has gone

19. XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Stenograficheskii Otchet), (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1966, v. 1), p. 414.

into the construction of E-2 class submarines. In either event, the most recent Soviet atomic submarines would fall into the broad category of counterforce capability. It is also possible that Malinovsky was referring to some such defensive network built around submarines. This question requires further examination.

It can be seen from an examination of the Soviet ship-building effort of the last ten years that the main emphasis has been placed upon defense. The great majority of the ships constructed in the past decade (with the exception only of the ballistic missile submarines) appear to have been designed for the purpose of countering attacks by fast carrier strike forces or by Polaris missile submarines during the initial period of a nuclear war. As these vessels have become operational in the fleet, older vessels with an application in limited war situations, such as the Skory class destroyer, have been retired from service faster than they have been replaced by new construction. Even the submarine fleet has declined in size by about one hundred since 1960 as older conventionally-powered boats, especially the coastal defense type, have been retired from service or sold to other nations. As the fleet declined in size, its new armament drastically increased its range of effectiveness and its capability for defense against carrier forces and ballistic missile submarines. The ships of the new Soviet Navy are overwhelmingly designed for utilization in counterforce operations in nuclear war.

CHAPTER TWO: THE SOVIET NAVY AND THE STRATEGIC DEBATE

The decision to unilaterally reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces by 1,200,000, which was announced by Chairman Khrushchev in his important speech of January 14, 1960, touched off an extensive strategic debate in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev justified the move as a demonstration of the good will of the Soviet Union which was made possible by the vastly increased firepower of Soviet arms. This latter development, he contended, made it possible to reduce the Soviet armed forces without adversely affecting the defense of the nation. He admitted that the move also would have favorable economic consequences, but denied that this was the motivating consideration.

Commenting on the increased firepower of the Soviet armed forces, Khrushchev said:

Our state possesses powerful rocketry. With the present development of military techniques, military aviation and the Navy have lost their former importance. These arms are not reduced, but replaced. Military aviation is almost entirely being replaced by rockets. Now we have sharply cut down and will, it seems, reduce still further or even entirely end the production of bombers and other obsolete equipment. In the Navy, the submarine gains in importance, whereas surface ships can no longer play the role they played in the past. Our armed forces have been to a considerable degree regeared to rocket and nuclear weapons.¹

Although the military leaders present at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet dutifully announced their support for the move, there were hints of unrest from the beginning. Defense Minister

1. Pravda, January 15, 1960.

Malinovsky commented that the remaining 2,423,000 men in the Soviet armed forces, "under their constant readiness and high vigilance, will doubtless secure for us the full capability at any time to deal a smashing rebuff to any aggressor."² The tone of this comment indicates that he felt the armed forces would have a difficult time achieving this state of readiness, and that perhaps there was some doubt as to their ability to do so. The naval representative, Admiral Kasatonov, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, assured the Supreme Soviet that "we consider it completely feasible to significantly reduce the number of personnel of the Soviet Navy, including the Black Sea Fleet."³ He did not, however, go so far as to state that it was desirable, and indicated that the Navy's enthusiasm was contingent on the prospect that there would be no lowering of the Navy's firepower. He further warned the body not to forget that in capitalist countries there are people interested not in lowering, but in increasing international tension and continuing the arms race.

Under these conditions of scarcely concealed opposition by the military establishment, especially by the more traditional armed services, it is necessary to examine in more detail the reasons which compelled Khrushchev to announce this move. While denying that the reduction was dictated exclusively by considerations of economy, Khrushchev did admit that,

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., January 16, 1960.

As you know, the question of economy is always timely and of great importance. The lower the expenditure on nonproductive objectives, the more funds will go for reproduction of the means of production, for developing the economy, and thus increasing the output and satisfying the people's material and spiritual requirements more fully.⁴

He estimated that the reduction would save the Soviet people about 17 billion rubles annually (1.7 billion rubles since the reevaluation of 1961).

The financial savings told only part of the story. The terrible devastation undergone by the Soviet Union during World War II had resulted in a large drop in the birth rate. As the youths born during those years began to reach military age, the number of males of military age began to decline. In 1960, the number of males of military age was estimated at about 32 million. By 1967, the number was down to about 29 million, and would not attain the 1960 level again until well after 1970.⁵ The military services were not the only priority claimant for these personnel. A large number of them were required to be trained as scientists at institutions of higher education, and still more were required as inputs of skilled labor for the growing Soviet industrial complex. A reduction in the number of personnel in the armed forces would alleviate the pressure on the industrial establishment.

This very difficult manpower dilemma had been complicated

4. Ibid., January 15, 1960.

5. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1962), p. 22.

by the program initiated with the seven-year plan of 1959 of gradually reducing the work week from six days to five days. To accomplish this feat without lowering overall production, in fact while continuing a very substantial rate of economic growth at a time when the new inputs to the industrial manpower pool were declining, required a readjustment of priorities.

A third consideration leading to the reduction of armed forces was related to the agricultural sector of the economy. Beginning about 1958, the Soviet rate of economic growth began to decline. This decline in the growth rate was almost entirely due to failures of production in the agricultural sector of the economy. Since the beginning of collectivization in 1928, the Soviet leadership had concentrated their investment in the area of heavy industry. Agriculture received some investment in the form of machinery, but such developments as chemical fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and all of the contributions to agriculture made by the science of chemistry, had not been applied to Soviet agriculture. By 1960 it was apparent that a reordering of priorities was necessary. Substantial investment was required in the agricultural sector of the economy. Savings in the military sector could be utilized to this end.

The lengths to which Khrushchev may have been forced to go in order to get the Soviet High Command "on board" for this force reduction can only be surmised. It does appear from the record, however, that a part of the argument used in support of the measure was the likelihood that the United States might reciprocate in some measure. The Supreme Soviet, when it passed

the law for the reduction of the armed forces, accompanied it with an "Appeal to the Parliaments and Governments of All Countries of the World". This appeal expressed "the hope that the Soviet Union's new and unilateral reduction of its armed forces will serve as an example to other states, especially those possessing the greatest military power".⁶ It seems very likely that the Soviet leadership expected some sort of American response to be agreed to at the time of the forthcoming Paris summit conference between Eisenhower and Khrushchev and Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union.

Actually, Khrushchev had been laying the groundwork since 1958 for an increasingly consumer-oriented policy at home, which would be financed largely out of savings from military expenditures. The seven-year-plan introduced at the extraordinary Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU in January, 1959 laid the foundations for the domestic policy. A cut in military expenditures required a detente with the United States. Khrushchev assiduously attempted to lay the foundation for such a detente during his visit to the United States in the fall of 1959. It was in connection with this visit that he tried to present a picture to the Soviet people that there was no immediate danger of an attack from the United States. It was at this same time that the Soviet Union began to dissociate itself from the belligerent activities of Communist China, most notably by assuming a neutral stance in the Chinese border

6. Pravda, January 16, 1960.

dispute with India. It was also in June of 1959 that the Soviet Union halted its program of nuclear assistance to the Chinese. It was on the basis of this foundation of a new detente that Khrushchev made his defense policy announcement of January, 1960.

When Secretary of Defense Gates testified before the House Armed Services Subcommittee in closed session in February, the Russians payed close attention. Malinovsky publicly deplored the fact that Gates contended that there was nothing to suggest a possibility of a treaty or other agreement with the Soviet Union which might lower United States security requirements. Malinovsky charged that Gates had ignored the January decision for a unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces. The U-2 incident on May Day, 1962, and the subsequent collapse of the summit conference must have disappointed the doves in the Kremlin even more deeply than did Gates' testimony, while at the same time boosting the case of the hawks.

Nevertheless, Khrushchev continued to push his consumer-oriented program even after the U-2 incident, although he made it known that "some comrades" opposed his program.⁷ The opposition eventually manifested itself in a shakeup in the organization of the party Secretariat in June, which somewhat reduced Khrushchev's influence. Opposition within the military made itself felt in muffled references to the "combined arms" concept of operations, rather than reliance upon a single arm. Khrushchev went to extraordinary lengths in order to pursue his

7. Ibid., May 6, 1960.

policy of detente abroad and economic reform at home. At the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party in Bucharest in June, 1960, Khrushchev took the occasion to sharply attack the Chinese Communists whose public pronouncements argued against the policy of detente.

This Bucharest meeting planned the meeting of 81 fraternal parties held in Moscow in November, 1960. During the November meeting, a declaration of the 81 Communist parties was drawn up in an attempt to reshape some semblance of international Communist unity. During the preparation of the document, according to later Chinese revelations, the Soviet delegation proposed the following theses which were rejected:⁸

1. That peaceful coexistence and economic competition form the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries;

2. That the emergence of a new stage in the general crisis of capitalism is the result of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition;

3. That there is a growing possibility of peaceful transition to communism.

Again according to the Chinese report, which seems to correspond fairly closely to the facts, at Chinese insistence the following theses were included in the statement:

1. On the unaltered nature of imperialism;
2. On U.S. imperialism as the enemy of the people of the

8. Peking Review, no. 37, 1963.

whole world;

3. On the national-liberation movement as a significant force in preventing world war;

4. On support by the socialist countries and the international working-class movement for the national-liberation struggle.⁹

Khrushchev signed the statement December 1, 1960, and almost immediately began to dilute the significance of the concessions made to the Chinese point of view. The logic of the Chinese position tended to support the militant critics of Khrushchev, including the military, and to oppose his economic measures. It is in light of this that Khrushchev's famous speech of January 6, 1961 must be understood.

A great deal of attention has been given to Khrushchev's speech, especially those portions dealing with wars of national liberation. One student of Soviet affairs referred to it as "Khrushchev's Mein Kampf" in Senate testimony.¹⁰ Actually, the speech was nothing of the kind. The December declaration of 81 Communist parties was a compromise document attempting to reconcile the divergent views of the Soviet leadership and the Chinese leadership on such fundamental questions as the "inevitability of war" and "peaceful coexistence". Each side could draw from the document theoretical statements to buttress its own position. Khrushchev's speech was a personal report of the

9. Ibid.

10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1961), p.2.

conference in which he attempted to extract from the Declaration only those statements which supported his own policies and to elaborate on their correctness. He put particular emphasis on the possibility of "peaceful coexistence".

The key to Khrushchev's argument for a greater expenditure of funds on consumer industries was the defensive strength of the Soviet military. He asserted:

For the first time in history, the present balance of power in the world arena enables the Socialist camp and other peace-loving forces to pursue the completely realistic task of compelling the imperialists, under the threat of the down fall of their system, not to unleash a world war.¹¹

Because of this strength, and the developing strength of Soviet industry, he contended that other aims need no longer be sacrificed to meet the needs of defense. "Why", he asked, "should we deny ourselves the things which people can enjoy without jeopardizing the further development of our socialist state?"¹²

In the most widely discussed portion of the speech, Khrushchev condemned world wars because of their tremendous destructiveness, and opposed "local wars" on the grounds that they might easily escalate into world wars. With regard to what he called "national-liberation" wars, however, he said, "Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with people waging liberation struggles".¹³ Interestingly

11. Kommunist, January, 1961.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

enough, he gave as examples of such wars the Vietnamese war which was settled in 1954 at Geneva largely through Soviet pressure on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to accept a compromise solution, and the Algerian war, in which the Soviet government did not even recognize the FLN at the time of the speech, nor did they do so until after France did. If communists were marching in the front ranks of these struggles, they were notably not Russian communists.

All of this suggests that the purpose of this portion of Khrushchev's speech was not to outline a method whereby the Russians would foster revolutionary uprisings around the world, but rather to justify inaction. The justification for peaceful coexistence in terms of the international Communist movement was that it would create the kind of environment in which national-liberation movements could achieve success while the Russians essentially stayed on the sidelines and cheered.

"Peaceful coexistence", he said;

helps to develop the forces of progress, the forces struggling for socialism, and in capitalist countries it facilitates the activities of Communist Parties and other progressive organizations of the working class. It facilitates the struggle the people wage against aggressive military blocs, against foreign military bases. It helps¹⁴ the national liberation movement to gain successes.

He even went so far as to claim that portions of the bourgeoisie could be recruited in the struggle for peaceful coexistence.

14. Ibid.

The significance of the national-liberation question for the role of the Navy is clear. If the Soviet government were planning for the contingency of supporting national-liberation movements militarily at various places around the world, then they would have to develop a corresponding Naval sea lift and logistics capability. Khrushchev was buying none of this.

Khrushchev's whole strategy rested on the thin reed of an assumed superiority in nuclear deterrent capability. He was almost certainly as aware as his military advisers that such a superiority did not in fact exist. The question probably was whether the Americans knew this or not. The U-2 incident must have given the Russian military good reason to believe that the United States government was well aware that no "missile gap" existed. But public debate in the United States during the 1960 presidential campaign tended to support Khrushchev's contention for the purposes of public debate in the USSR. The Soviet Marshals could hardly stand up in public and deny that the Soviet Union was in a superior position.

Early actions of the Kennedy regime tended to pull this prop out from under Khrushchev's position. On March 28, 1961, Kennedy delivered a special message to Congress calling for increased military expenditure to build up both the conventional and the nuclear strategic capabilities of the United States. Later in the year assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric revealed publicly that the United States was aware that no "missile gap" existed.¹⁵ In July, in connection with

15. New York Times, October 22, 1961.

the developing Berlin crisis, Khrushchev announced a three billion ruble increase in the Soviet Defense budget and simultaneously suspended demobilization.¹⁶ For the time being, Khrushchev's program of defense economy had failed.

On the other hand, the military opponents of Khrushchev did not yet feel they had won a victory. The question of allocation of resources again appeared prominently in the speeches and declarations of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, held in October, 1961. One of the most important questions considered at the congress was the approval of a new program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). No program had been developed since Lenin had drafted one in 1919. Naturally, the new program provided an opportunity for various groups in the Soviet Union to plead their case. As soon as the draft appeared, even before the Congress met, the military managed to publicize its version of the significance of the program as it related to the military. Air Force General A. Podolski, writing in the military newspaper Red Star, observed:

All personnel of the Army and Navy, like the whole Soviet people, warmly approve the indications included in the draft program of the party that the CPSU considers it necessary to maintain the defensive might of the Soviet Union, the combat readiness of its armed forces, at a level insuring the decisive and complete defeat of any enemy that desires to encroach upon the Soviet homeland.¹⁷

He went on to imply strongly that the Soviet Military did not

16. Pravda, July 8, 1961.

17. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 10, 1961.

believe the current combat readiness met this criteria. The Twenty-Second Congress ended in what amounted to a stalemate. The heavy industrial lobby, the "metal-eaters" as Khrushchev called them, and the military managed to hold off the full measure of trimming that Khrushchev wanted to implement. Khrushchev's policy was not, however, completely repudiated.

During 1960 and 1961, the Soviet Navy remained curiously aloof from the strategic debate as it appeared in the Soviet press. By early 1962, however, some naval spokesmen began to air their grievances with the policy of reliance on submarines. In his report to the Twenty-Second Congress Khrushchev had commented, "The Soviet submarine fleet with atomic engines, armed with ballistic and homing missiles, vigilantly stands guard over our socialist achievements".¹⁸ In an article ostensibly devoted to expounding on the theme of the submarine as the "main striking force" of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Prokofiev commented, "the idea of a one-sided absolutization of one or another type of force is alien to Soviet naval thought".¹⁹ In order to leave no doubt as to what he was referring, he quoted the above passage from Khrushchev's speech.

In May an Army spokesman, Col. I. Sidelnikov, writing on Soviet military doctrine, presented a forceful statement of the combined arms concept. He opened his article with a discussion of Soviet military doctrine in the prewar period, in what was clearly an attack on the policies of Khrushchev.

18. Pravda, October 18, 1961.

19. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 13, 1962.

"An enormous loss to the defensive capability of the country and the military preparedness of the Army and the Navy", he wrote, "was inflicted by the personality cult of Stalin".²⁰ While he accorded to nuclear missile forces the primary place in modern warfare, he rejected the idea that firepower could replace manpower and that the old forms of military power could now be dispensed with.

The decisive role of nuclear missile forces in war does not lessen the significance of other forms of arms. A final and decisive victory over imperialist aggressors can be achieved only as a result of combined, well-coordinated and decisive movements of all forms of armed forces and types of arms. Nuclear-missile war will be conducted by mass, multimillion man armies.²¹

"This means", he concludes, "that it is necessary even in the future to seriously perfect not only the new, but even so to speak, the old forms of the armed forces and types of arms".²²

This theme was shortly applied in a naval context by retired Fleet Admiral I. S. Isakov, who had commanded the Soviet Navy during World War II. Defending the role of the surface fleet, Isakov pointed out,

while the population of our planet transports cargoes by sea routes and while there exists a mer-

20. Krasnaya Zvezda, May 11, 1962. The implication here was that Khrushchev was also developing a personality cult which may have equally disastrous results on Soviet military strategy.

21. Ibid. (Emphasis mine).

22. Ibid.

chant fleet, nothing except a navy can guarantee its safety of movement along sea routes. In certain conditions sea communications can be defended by missiles, aircraft and other means. But you cannot do without a surface fleet.²³

Writing in Krasnaya Zvezda on Soviet Navy Day, Admiral F. V. Zozulya, while giving pride of place to the submarine (which he claimed was capable of firing missiles while submerged), was careful to note that "surface ships also carry out an important service."²⁴ Other naval spokesmen continued to speak for the cause of the surface ship, but Admiral Gorshkov, Soviet naval Commander-in-Chief, was not among them.

During the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, Admiral Gorshkov did describe the mission of the Soviet Navy in what appears to be a new way. "The Soviet Navy", he said, "by the character of her armament of highly maneuverable forces and military capabilities is obliged to be prepared at any moment and at any point of the globe to secure the protection of the interests of our state".²⁵ Gorshkov noted that this formula applied especially to the submarine fleet. The formula "pro-

23. Nedelya, no. 23, June 9, 1962.

24. "Vsegda na Strazhe", Krasnaya Zvezda, July 29, 1962.

25. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 31, 1962. The significance of the formula "protection of the interests of our state" as a description of the role of the Soviet Navy is obscure. Western commentators first noticed the use of this formula in the summer of 1967, but it has in fact been a standard and recurring formula for describing the role of the Soviet Navy since at least October, 1962. If the phrase was used before that time, it has not been discovered by the author. Whatever its significance, its use by Gorshkov on Navy Day, 1967, did not represent a new formulation.

tection of the state interests" is particularly interesting because it has not been applied to any other arm of the Soviet armed forces, although in recent years it has become the standard way of describing the role of the Navy.

The concept of "protection of state interests" is clearly distinguished from the defense of the country as such. Writing in 1963, Admiral Gorshkov stated,

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are displaying wise foresight, taking all measures to insure that the armament and organization of our fleet correspond to its growing role in the defense [oborona] of the country, in the protection [zashchita] of its state interests.²⁶

He went on to show that the Soviet Navy would operate differently than it did during World War II:

During the last war, the actions of the fleet occurred basically in the regions close to shore and were conducted mainly in operational and tactical interaction with the army. Now, considering the intention of aggressors and the place given to their navies in the plan of nuclear attack on the socialist countries, we must be prepared to answer them with destructive strikes at naval and shore objectives on the whole territory of the world ocean.²⁷

Even in this context Gorshkov reiterated the fact that the basic strike force of the Navy has become the nuclear powered submarine equipped with missiles. "The sole domination of the ocean by the traditional sea powers", he said, "is ended by the

26. Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5, 1963.

27. Ibid.

creation of our new Navy, equipped with atomic power plants, missile technology, and radioelectronics".

From the public discussion of naval affairs early in 1963, it becomes clear that the decision had been made to break loose from the confines of the regions close to shore where the Navy had traditionally operated. This was not a decision which could be immediately implemented due to shortcomings in the training of Soviet naval personnel. This decision seems to have been based on the necessity of operating their ballistic-missile submarines close to American shores, and the necessity of operating their defensive naval forces further at sea than in the past in order to counter the increased range of western naval weapons. The western naval weapons of greatest concern were the fast carrier strike forces and Polaris submarines.

Soviet military observers had been carefully following the strategic debate in the United States and were well aware of the second strike concept and the place of Polaris in this concept.²⁸ Gorshkov's statement that "the hopes of the strategists across the ocean that their communications, and even more their shores, will be inaccessible to our Navy in time of war have proved illusory",²⁹ seems to imply a kind of a "second strike" role for the Soviet missile submarines.

At the same time, Soviet naval spokesmen were quick to claim that the Polaris submarine was by no means invulnerable.

28. See, for example. Major General M. Milshtein, "On the Military Doctrine of the USA" (O voennoi doktrine S.Sh.A.), Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5, 1963.

29 Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5, 1963.

When, early in 1963, the United States made plans to remove the Thor and Jupiter missile bases in England, Italy, and Turkey, and replace them with Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, the Russians followed the developments closely.³⁰ On the question of the invulnerability of Polaris, aviation Major General S. Ruban pointed out that such claims had previously been made for the aircraft carrier, but these had turned out not to be true. "Our naval missile-carrying aviation is capable of rendering them destructive blows", he wrote, "without entering their zone of antiair defense."³¹ Defense Minister A. Ya. Malinovsky, in a speech commemorating the 45th anniversary of the Soviet armed forces, made the claim that "naval missile-carrying and antisubmarine aviation has become a very important force. It has the capability of hunting down at sea and destroying submarines as well as the surface ships of the enemy."³²

Such statements as those by Ruban and Malinovsky also point up the fact that spokesmen for other arms of the Navy were not willing to give up to the submarine without a fight. Although statements claiming a great ability of aircraft to counter atomic-powered submarines have never carried much conviction, the claims with regard to their ability to counter carrier task forces were dramatically illustrated in the course of 1963. During the year, Soviet naval air units began on a routine basis to search out and fly over carrier task forces

30. "Polaris-idol Pentagona", Krasnaya Zvezda, Feb. 15, 1963.

31. Ibid., June 5, 1963.

32. Ibid.

deploying to both the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, in an attempt to demonstrate the vulnerability of carrier forces³³ to land-based naval air.

Admiral Gorshkov claimed that these operations were increasingly successful. "In a series of instances our ships and naval aviation", he claimed, "have demonstrated operational and active actions as a result of which some foreign governments became convinced that they could not consider their aircraft carriers and submarines "invisible", "untouchable", and in the event of war "invulnerable" in whatever areas they may be located".³⁴ He informed naval personnel that they must be capable of going wherever the orders of the fatherland sent them to carry out their missions in support of the state interests of the Soviet Union and to remain there as long as necessary. "For the Soviet Navy", he asserted, "1964 is the year of the routine long cruise".³⁵

In the meantime, there were some interesting signs that the political position of the Navy was improving. When Admiral Gorshkov was named Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, he was at first only a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, although his predecessor had been a full member. He remained in this status at the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959. At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, however, both Gorshkov and his First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral

33. New York Times, June 5, 1963.

34. "Flot v bol'shom plavanii", Krasnaya Zvezda, March 21, 1964.

35. Ibid.

Vitalii Fokin, were elected to full membership in the Central Committee. Central Committee membership, in itself, does not confer any particular power on the member, but election does coincide very closely to the real power situation within the party. To have two full members on the Central Committee instead of only one candidate member indicated that the influence of the Soviet Navy had increased greatly between the two party conferences.

When Admiral Fokin died in January, 1964, his successor, Admiral Vladimir Afanasievich Kasatonov, apparently did not assume Fokin's place on the Central Committee. Kasatonov is, however, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. At the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU in April, 1966, two Soviet Admirals, Admiral Amel'ko, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Lobov, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, were elected to candidate membership of the Central Committee. The only other military officers whose position was improved at the Twenty-Third Congress were the district commanders of five of the most important military districts.

Other indications of increased influence of the Navy included the promotion of Gorshkov to the rank of Fleet Admiral in 1962, a rank which had not been filled since Kuznetsov's retirement in 1956. In 1965, Admiral Kasatonov was also promoted to the rank of Fleet Admiral.

This increased influence does not necessarily mean, however, that the Navy was receiving a greater allocation of resources. The number of major ships in the Soviet Navy (that

is, destroyer escort and larger) appears to have reached a peak sometime in 1963, and to have declined since then as older units were retired from service faster than they were being replaced. At the same time, according to estimates by the Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of personnel in the Soviet Navy declined during 1964 from about 500,000 to about 465,000.³⁶ Nonetheless the decline was not large and was accompanied by a significant modernization of the fleet.

As for the military budget as a whole, Khrushchev had been increasingly unable to hold down military spending. After his decision in June, 1961, to increase military spending over the budget estimate, the overt military budget increased steadily each year.³⁷ Early in 1963, it looked as if Khrushchev might be losing his hold on the military and heavy industry segments of the economy entirely. He was, however, finally able to obtain an expanded program for the production of chemical fertilizers for agriculture, and to cut the military budget by 600 million rubles.

The budget cut led the military to renew the strategic

36. See The Military Balance, 1963-1964 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963) and The Military Balance, 1964-1965 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964).

37. There is a great deal of controversy over just how much the Russians actually do spend on defense. The published figure seems ridiculously low for such a large military establishment. Most observers do agree, however, that the published figures at least indicate trends in defense spending. The published budget for defense expenditures are as follows (in billions of rubles): 1959: 9.4; 1960: 9.3; 1961: 11.6; 1962: 12.7; 1963: 13.9; 1964: 13.3; 1965: 12.8.

debate. Colonel General Lomov renewed the argument in favor of a combined arms concept, stressing that victory in modern warfare requires "a multimillion man modern army".³⁸ The growing irritation Khrushchev felt at the pressure being brought to bear on him by the military was revealed in a speech he made in Egypt. Speaking to a group of Egyptian officers on May 18, he said: "I do not know how it is in the U.A.R., but my esteemed friend the President would be able to tell me whether a military person ever tells him: 'Do not give us any more weapons, there are enough of them.' For with us this is not said".³⁹

The military conservatives were only one element with which Khrushchev had to contend to further his program of emphasis on consumer-related production. The more conservative among the civilian hierarchy were suspicious for other reasons of the diversion of resources to light industry. Various factions were becoming more and more dissatisfied with Khrushchev's leadership, in both domestic and foreign affairs. Abruptly in October of 1964, Khrushchev was ousted as leader of the Party and government and placed in retirement. Although the full details of Khrushchev's ouster are not yet known, it seems as though the military leaders did not play an important part in his downfall. They appear to have adopted a position rather of guarded neutrality.

As far as the Navy is concerned, at no time did the naval leadership repudiate Khrushchev's program of primary reliance

38. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 7 and 10, 1964.

39. Moscow Radio, May 18, 1964.

on the submarine as the main "striking force" of the Navy. The strategic debate that did appear during Khrushchev's time with regard to naval affairs amounted to guarded assertions by surface and aviation officers that their arms, too, had an important role to play. Some concessions were made in both of these directions. Up through 1964, about 18 guided missile destroyers were constructed. In 1964, the Naval Infantry (Soviet equivalent of the Marines) was organized again, but this was little more than a token gesture. About 3,000 men were assigned to this force. The overflights of U.S. carriers by Soviet naval aircraft were probably attempts by advocates of naval air to demonstrate the continued usefulness of manned aircraft. They seem to have been partly successful in this.

In many respects, 1964 was an important year of transition for the Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov called it the "year of the routine long cruise", and during the year the Soviet Navy did begin to appear more and more often on the high seas. Gorshkov and most of the other senior naval officers seemed to accept Khrushchev's concept of the submarine as the most important arm of the Navy, although a few dissenters made their voices heard.

To judge from the published articles, speeches, and interviews of Soviet naval officers, the primary concern of the Navy was to defend against the twin threat of attack by American carrier task force or by Polaris submarine. The Soviet Navy was taking to the high seas in order to be able to carry this defense line farther away from the Soviet homeland. There is evidence

that some naval spokesmen joined with the other conventional forces to oppose the defense budget cuts so assiduously pursued by Khrushchev. These officers, like their professional brethren in other countries, felt that they were being given inadequate tools with which to fulfill an awesome responsibility. There is no evidence in the open record that Soviet naval officers advocated that the Soviet leadership pursue a more active or belligerent foreign policy.

CHAPTER THREE: THE SOVIET NAVY AND POLITICS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

By the time the new triumvirate of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny took over responsibility for the conduct of Soviet affairs, the usual formula for describing the nature of the Soviet Navy had been modified to include an important place for surface ships and naval aviation. As the horizons of the Navy began to broaden, so did those of the other services. Marshal Kiril Moskalenko, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (who had been relieved of his job in April, 1962, probably due to his opposition to the Cuban missile adventure) wrote:

Soviet military science decisively rejects any arbitrary fabrications...that one could, as it were, achieve victory by the employment of one or more new weapons. There are no weapons which possess such exceptional and all-powerful qualities.¹

Notwithstanding the pleas of various military leaders for a greater allocation of resources, especially to conventional arms, the new leadership took several measures which seemed to further reduce the importance of conventional forces. Some time late in 1964, they abolished the Ground Forces command as a separate entity and merged it with the General Staff. They also continued the reduction of the Soviet armed forces which

1. Krasnaya Zvezda, September 25, 1964.

had begun under Khrushchev.² This reduction fell mainly on the Army. In December, Kosygin announced a further reduction in the defense budget for 1965³ to a figure of 12.8 billion rubles.

All of these moves suggest strongly that the dissatisfaction of the military played little or no part in the overthrow of Khrushchev. At any rate, if the new leadership owed any debt of gratitude to the military, they were not repaying it.

In his speech on the anniversary of the October revolution, Brezhnev stressed the importance of contacts with the west and opposed the continuation of the arms race. "We are coming out for an end to the arms race", he said, "for general and complete disarmament, for relieving the peoples from the mounting burden of military expenditures."⁴ Brezhnev seemed to be precluding any adventures of the Cuban or Berlin variety, probably in an effort to reduce tension in Europe.⁵ This would allow a reduction of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe and their redeployment to the Far East. Podgorny's visit to Ankara in January 1965 seems to fit in with this pattern.

In February, 1965, A. N. Shelepin headed a party delegation to Mongolia. During his visit, he acquainted the Mongolian party with Russian plans for 1965, "including the question of better quality in production, the increase in the tempo

2. In a Moscow press conference in February 1965, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky claimed that the Soviet armed forces had been reduced to 2,423,000 men. This is the number originally set by Khrushchev in 1960. Radio Moscow, February 17, 1965.

3. Pravda, December 10, 1964.

4. Pravda, November 8, 1964. (Emphasis mine).

of those branches of industry which make consumer goods, and with the problem of developing agriculture."⁵ Shelepin drew the logical consequences for Soviet foreign policy, pointing out that the success of the program "demands favorable external conditions". "We need peace", he said, "and in our foreign policy we, as always, shall consistently and unflaggingly fight for the realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence."⁶

Shelepin's position seems to represent the consensus of the political leadership at the beginning of 1965. As the United States intensified its involvement in Vietnam by initiating the bombing of North Vietnam in February, however, the military leadership opened a new phase of the strategic debate. The old questions of the nature of modern warfare and the expected duration of war arose anew.

In March, Colonel Larionov, an Army spokesman, wrote an article attacking excessive reliance on missile forces. "Among military personnel", he wrote,

you often hear an opinion like this: 'in a swift-flowing war, victory will be achieved by one strike of the strategic rocket forces'. This is an erroneous opinion. In a swift-flowing war, just as in a prolonged war, victory over the enemy will be attained by the combined efforts of all forms of the armed forces and kinds of troops.⁷

Larionov noted that in the past war the French had relied on

5. Pravda, February 6, 1965.

6. Ibid.

7. "Novoe oruzhie i prodolzhitel'nost' voyna", Krasnaya Zvezda, March 18, 1965.

the Maginot line for defense and the United States and Great Britain had relied upon having enough time to mobilize. But nuclear war has changed that. He noted that the United States budget indicated that the Pentagon was building up the means for nuclear war of the swift-flowing kind, but also building up forces for a prolonged war. He made a strong case that the Soviet Union should do likewise.

Other military spokesmen soon joined in the chorus. General Rotmistrov, Assistant Defense Minister, came out firmly for the combined arms concept, and opposed economizing on defense. "The aggressiveness of imperialism," he wrote, "forces the Communist Party and the whole Soviet people to raise constantly the military might of the Soviet homeland, to develop the national economy and all other branches of state construction in the USSR in the interest of raising its defense capability."⁸ This was clearly intended as an admission to the Soviet political leadership.

A reserve Lieutenant Colonel, G. Miftiev, carried the argument even further. Miftiev maintained that, even in the event of thermonuclear war, multimillion-man armies will be necessary. He pointed out that, even though the destructiveness per man of modern weapons is very high, this does not necessarily lessen the personnel requirement for the following reasons:

1. Soviet military doctrine envisages general war cover-

8. Kommunist, March, 1965.

ing large areas of the globe in theater warfare;

2. Modern weapons technology allows fewer men to effect more damage, but the use of nuclear arms will be accompanied by large losses of personnel whose replacement will be difficult. For this reason, the personnel on hand at the beginning of the war must be prepared to conduct active military operations, independent of mobilization measures;

3. The technical revolution has expanded the requirement for maintenance personnel and thus reduced the relative weight of combat forces in the total number of military personnel.⁹

In sharp contrast to the dissident Army elements, the Soviet naval leadership showed every sign of being satisfied with current policies of the regime. In an interview with a Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent, Admiral Gorshkov reaffirmed Khrushchev's naval policy of shifting emphasis to submarines. "In our opinion" he declared, "time has already nullified the significance of such major warships as battleships and cruisers. aircraft carriers are also losing their importance. Modern weapons make it possible to locate them quickly and to destroy them before they can use their armament."¹⁰ When asked what type of vessel now leads the fleet, he replied "Atomic submarines! They are the basis of the might of our fleet."¹¹

9. "Voina i lyudskie resursy" (War and reserves of people), Krasnaya Zvezda, June 4, 1965.

10. Literaturnaya Gazeta, May 6, 1965.

11. Ibid. This statement seems to make it clear that a naval desire for more conventional arms played no part whatsoever in the overthrow of Khrushchev.

The materials prepared for presentation during the Navy Day celebrations of 1965 went even further in proclaiming the satisfaction of the naval leadership. For the first time, the growing role of the Navy was tied to the growth of the Soviet merchant marine. "The necessity of strengthening the naval might of the USSR is stipulated also by the rapid development of our cargo and commercial fleet, and the broadening of state interests of our country on the seas and oceans."¹² The editorial went on to say, "Thanks to the attention and concern of the Party, the government, and the whole Soviet people, our Navy has developed in full accordance with the aims and missions of a great naval power and plays an important role in the defense capability of the fatherland."¹³ The article asserted that the Soviet Navy has everything required in coordination with the other services to defend the state interests of the fatherland and the other socialist countries. Thus, by implication, the other services must also have all that is required. This opinion was definitely not shared by Army spokesmen such as Larionov, Rotmistrov, and Miftiev.

During Navy Day celebrations, Soviet Naval satisfaction with the status quo was reaffirmed by Admiral Grishanov.¹⁴ A photograph of Soviet missile submarines and destroyers was

12. "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhei" (On guard over the sea defenses), Krasnaya Zvezda, July 13, 1965.

13. Ibid.

14. "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhei otchizny", Krasnaya Zvezda, July 24, 1965.

printed with the caption "formidable submarines and surface missile carriers now constitute the basic strike force of the fleet...."¹⁵

If the Soviet Army and Navy were not speaking with one voice on military matters, neither was the political leadership unified. Speaking in Baku in May, 1965, N. V. Podgorny, the Soviet head of state, said:

There was a time when the Soviet people deliberately accepted certain material restrictions in the interests of the priority development of heavy industry and the strengthening of our defense capability. This was fully justified, because it is precisely production which is the material basis for the growth of culture and of the welfare of our people, and a defenceless socialist state would have been inevitably crushed by imperialism.¹⁶

Podgorny implied that these ideas are no longer correct. In this regard, he was echoing almost exactly the words of Khrushchev in his speech of January 6, 1961.

Speaking a few days later, M. A. Suslov, who had long demonstrated an antipathy to "goulash communism", spoke out in opposition to Podgorny. Speaking in Bulgaria, Suslov said:

In conditions where imperialist powers pursue an arms race and unleash military aggression in various parts of the world, our party and government must maintain the defense of the country on the highest level....All this, of course, demands from the Soviet people considerable material sacrifices, expenditures on defense of a significant portion

15. Ibid., July 25, 1965.

16. Pravda, May 22, 1965.

of the national income.¹⁷

By mid-July, Premier Kosygin, who had previously straddled the fence on the issue, came out against "economizing on defense".¹⁸

The next round of discussion was played out on Navy Day. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the defeat of Germany in World War II, each of the four Soviet fleets (Black Sea, Baltic, Northern, and Pacific) was awarded the order of the Red Banner for its exploits in that war. (Previously only the Baltic Fleet had achieved this honor, for actions in the Revolution). On this auspicious occasion the awards were made by four members of the Presidium: Kosygin, Podgorny, Kirilenko, and Shelopin. Each took the occasion to express his views on the question of defense.

Speaking before the officers and the men of the Northern Fleet, Shelopin talked about the great destruction of the last war, enumerating a long list of dismal figures, concluding with the fact that 20 million Soviet citizens perished in the war. "Think, comrades, about these figures," he said. "How much labor, tears, and bitterness of the Soviet people is there behind them. How much power and material was required to rebuild all of this."¹⁹ He went on to say that it had been rebuilt in a short time, but he had made a strong point about the terri-

17. Ibid., June 5, 1965.

18. Ibid., July 12, 1965.

19. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 25, 1965.

ble destructiveness of a war which had been fought with conventional weapons, and by implication, the even more terrible destructiveness of a nuclear war. He extolled the decision of the March Plenum to improve the development of agriculture and went on to speak of other kinds of production:

At the present time, comrades, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers are searching for a way for even greater development of productive forces, increasing the effectiveness of production and on this basis a further raising of the standard of living of the people, for to the Central Committee and to the government there is not at this time a more important task than to improve the lives of the Soviet people.²⁰

Clearly, Shelepin had not changed his position of February giving priority to domestic needs.²¹

Podgorny had also not moved very far from his previous position, but he chose to place the emphasis on unity rather than armament. He maintained that the strengthening of the position of socialism and of the national-liberation and working-class movements depended on the unity of all these forces.²² Kosygin, on the other hand, pointed out that "aggressive forces" headed by the United States were conducting

20. Ibid., (Emphasis mine).

21. In view of these two speeches of Shelepin it is difficult to understand how Roman Kolkowicz and others have identified Shelepin as joining with Suslov in 1965 "in siding with the military's point of view in emphasizing the importance of further strengthening Soviet defenses." See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 302.

22. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 25, 1965.

military provocations against peace-loving peoples. "In these conditions," he asserted, "the Communist Party, her Central Committee, and the Soviet Government consider care for the strengthening of the defensive might of the country its primary duty."²³ Kirilenko, speaking to the Pacific Fleet, made a statement similar to that of Kosygin.

By early August, the decision seems to have been made against economizing on defense. The lead editorial in the August issue of Kommunist declared, "In our times equipping the armed forces requires enormous resources. The Party and the government would rather direct these resources to peaceful branches of the economy. But in the present situation, to economize on defense would mean to compromise the interests of the Soviet state."²⁴ In December, premier Kosygin announced the first increase in the Soviet defense budget in three years to 13.2 billion rubles.²⁵

Naval spokesmen continued to express satisfaction with the state of the Soviet Navy, and Defense Minister Malinovsky's address to the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU indicated that they had every cause to be pleased. Malinovsky gave an unprecedented amount of attention to the Navy in his speech on Soviet defense. He gave to the submarine missile fleet the honor of standing "side by side" with the strategic rocket forces,

23. Ibid. (Emphasis mine).

24. Kommunist, no. 12, August, 1965.

25. Pravda, December 7, 1965.

which had previously been the glamour service.²⁶ Malinovsky asserted that the Russians had received new and powerful missile ships and an improved antisubmarine capability. He took the occasion to announce the completion of a submerged circumnavigation of the globe by a group of Soviet submarines a few days before the Congress.²⁷ It was in this same speech that he announced the completion of the "Blue Belt for Defense" which apparently is connected with atomic powered submarines and in some way with the just-completed circumnavigation.²⁸

In the meantime, a new round in the strategic debate had begun, again led by Army elements. Colonel E. Rybkin published an article attacking the moderate views of some military thinkers who in recent years had been willing to rely on nuclear deterrence and the rationality of Western political leaders.²⁹ Rybkin vehemently opposed the idea that victory in a nuclear-missile war was impossible, and advocated intensive development of military technology, improvement of the military art,

26. XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Stenograficheski Otchet) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury 2V., 1966), v. 1, p. 412.

27. Ibid., p. 413.

28. Ibid., p. 414. In order to properly analyze Soviet Naval strategy at this point it would be helpful to know whether the atomic submarines involved were missile-carrying or attack submarines (N-class). A photograph published with the press coverage shows one N-class submarine, but this is far from conclusive evidence. The report by a special correspondent was extremely vague on such details. See Krasnaya Zvezda, April 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17, 1966.

29. Colonel E. Rybkin, "O suschnosti mirovoi raketno-yadernoi voyny" (On the Essence of Worldwide Missile-Nuclear War), Kommunist Vooruzhenikh Sil, No. 17, Sept., 1965, pp. 50-56.

and the highest levels of military spending. In short, he wanted a greater allocation of resources to defense. Rybkin's article touched off a lively debate in letters to the editor, which was still going on in mid-1966.³⁰

There were signs that the question of military expenditures remained a vexatious one for the political leadership. At the Twenty-third Party Congress in April, 1966, it was announced that a new five-year plan was being prepared and would shortly be published. The plan was not, however, presented to the Supreme Soviet session held in August. This would seem to indicate that some issue of importance was holding up the plan. It may have been simply a problem of implementing the economic reforms and integrating them into the plan, but it seems likely that one of the important issues was the question of military expenditures. Early in June, 1966, the political leadership delivered a number of election speeches which were indicative of the political difficulties the leadership was experiencing on the military question at the time. Both Brezhnev and Kirilenko delivered speeches strongly inclined toward increased defense measures. Kirilenko declared, "The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government view the strengthening of the armed forces existing for the defense of the unfolding of socialism, for the protection of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, as their most important task."³¹ The rest of

30. See, for example, I. Grudin, "K voprosu o suschnosti voyny" (To the Question of the Essence of War), Krasnaya Zvezda, July 21, 1966.

31. Pravda, June 8, 1966.

the leadership was overwhelmingly moderate on the question of defense. Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov, Shelepin, Mazurov, and Polyansky all made moderate statements.

It is particularly interesting that Suslov, who had previously been identified as a hard-liner on defense questions even during the Khrushchev administration, had moderated his tone by the summer of 1966. Although he had nothing good to say about the west, he did not identify defense as the most important task of the party and the bulk of his speech was dedicated to the question of Party democracy.³² Shelepin chose to emphasize the measures taken by the Party to improve the lot of the Soviet people. Describing measures taken to improve the quality of consumer goods and raise prices, he said,

The Party and the government are taking and will continue to take in the future all measures in order that our people eat better and dress better, have prosperity and a choice of attractive, good quality and relatively inexpensive goods and in general live better. This is the main question, it, so to speak, stands first in the order of the day at all Plenums of the CC, CPSU, at meetings of the Politburo of the CC, CPSU, and in the government.³³

In his statement on the world situation, he described the misdeeds of the United States in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in words which were belligerent in tone, but

32. Ibid.

33. Pravda, June 3, 1966. Shelepin is worth quoting at length, because he has been incorrectly identified by a number of western observers as a Hawk on defense matters. Here, as in other speeches, he quite clearly gives priority to the improvement of the domestic economy with emphasis on consumer goods.

singularly devoid of content. "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union", he asserted, "will always be true to its duty before the fraternal countries of socialism, before world communism, and the national-liberation movement."³⁴ These are high sounding words, but he does not explain in concrete terms what this duty is, and nowhere in his speech does he so much as hint at the necessity for greater defense expenditure. Shelepin's statement is typical of the moderate statements issued by other political leaders at the time.

This apparent difference between Brezhnev and Polyansky and the rest of the Politburo on the question of priorities may in fact have had little to do with defense matters. At about the same time, an editorial appeared in Pravda on the permanence of the collective leadership.³⁵ This is a good indication that some of the collective leaders did not at that time feel assured of their permanence. This may explain Suslov's concern with party democracy in his election speech. Reports from ordinarily reliable sources reached the West at the time that Kosygin was planning to resign, ostensibly because he was tired of fighting hard liners on defense.³⁶ For "hardliners", one could probably read "Brezhnev".

The question of party democracy continued to agitate the Party press for the rest of the year and certain measures were taken to encourage real debate within the party committees at

34. Ibid.

35. Pravda, July 20, 1966.

36. London Times, July 31, 1966.

the local level on agendas submitted to them by the local party secretary.³⁷ The successful introduction of real debate at the local party committee level would end the "rubber stamp" character of the committees, thus reducing the power of the local party secretary and, through him, the power of the General Secretary of the Party, namely Leonid Brezhnev. This move would also have the effect of enlarging the decision-making elite to include the local committee members. Those who feared that the General Secretary might be able to establish hegemony as Stalin and Khrushchev had done before him, were apparently willing to pay this price.

As for the services, the Army continued to chafe at party leadership and to agitate for a more autonomous role in military affairs. Major-General Zemskov was probably describing a widespread feeling in the Soviet Army when he wrote, "In recent years in the foreign press the attempt is more and more often made to separate politics from war, to show that, if you please, political leadership has lost its role in contemporary war."³⁸

As for the Navy, there is no indication that such sentiments were widespread. On the contrary, there is evidence of increasing satisfaction by the Navy with its share of resource

37. See, for example Sharai's letter to the editor in Partiinaiia Zhizn', no. 1, January, 1966, and "Partiinyi Komitet-Organ Kollektivnogo Rukovodstva" (The Party Committee-an Organ of Collective Leadership) Partiinaiia Zhizn', No.11, June, 1966, p.3.

38. V. Zemskov, "Vazhnyi Faktor Pobedy v Voine" (The Important Factor of Victory in War), Krasnaya Zvezda, Jan.5, 1967.

allocation. Naval leaders began increasingly to express real pride in the role of the Navy. Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, when asked by a journalist if the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles had not decreased the role of the Navy replied, "By no means. On the contrary, the Navy's role has increased, because the missile has also become its basic armament."³⁹ He went on to assert that the Navy now has everything necessary to repel any aggressor in coordination with the other services.⁴⁰ Kasatonov later boasted that "the white and blue flag of the USSR Navy, with its red star and hammer and sickle" is seen "in all parts of the world."⁴¹ About the same time he asserted, "Currently we deploy everything necessary for our Navy to be at the level of contemporary requirements."⁴²

In the meantime, there were growing indications that the Soviet Navy was occupying a more prestigious position within the military hierarchy. When Admiral Fokin, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy died in 1964, Admiral Gorshkov's signature to the obituary appeared directly below the First Deputy Ministers of Defense, and above that of Marshal Krylov, head of the Strategic Rocket Forces.⁴³ That this was no accident

39. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, July 25, 1965.

40. Ibid.

41. Trud, July 30, 1966.

42. "Na Boevoi Vakhte" (On Watch), Krasnaya Zvezda, July 31, 1966.

43. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 24, 1964.

was confirmed upon the death of Defense Minister Malinovsky in 1967, when Gorshkov's name again appeared above that of Marshal Moskalenko, who had relieved Krylov as Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces.⁴⁴ This would appear to confirm that the Navy currently stands above the Strategic Missile Forces in the military hierarchy.

An example of the increasing concern of the political leaders for naval matters appeared in Brezhnev's speech to the Conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia in April, 1967. Brezhnev spoke at length on the United States 6th Fleet:

There is no justification for the permanent presence of the military fleet of the USA in the waters washing the shores of Southern Europe. The question is raised as to what basis there is for the fact that, 20 years after the end of the Second World War the 6th Fleet of the USA sails the Mediterranean Sea, using military bases, ports, and replenishment stations in a series of Mediterranean countries. This carries with itself a serious threat to the independence of all countries on this shore. The time has come for the demand to remove the 6th Fleet from the Mediterranean Sea to resound with full voice.⁴⁵

The removal of the 6th Fleet from the Mediterranean by this time would have had the effect of transferring Naval hegemony of the area to the Soviet Navy.

The sources of the increased prestige of the Soviet Navy with the political leaders are obscure. In a negative sense,

44. Krasnaya Zvezda, April 1, 1967.

45. Pravda, April 25, 1967.

it appears as though the Naval leadership never challenged the leadership and judgement of the Politburo to the extent that many Army leaders did. The consequent establishment of friendly relations with those persons located at the centers of power may have helped the Navy to achieve its aims in rebuilding the fleet. These aims were, for the most part, moderate ones. The connection between the Navy's mission and the growing importance of the Soviet Merchant Marine has already been cited.⁴⁶ Admiral Kasatonov has identified the power of the Soviet Navy with the "power of our first class industry", indicating the possibility that some ties with industrial managers may have helped to further the Navy's position.⁴⁷ If this is so, such ties would probably be with the more glamorous and fashionable industries associated with missile and space programs, such as electronics and the chemical industry. Such ties might also go far toward explaining the overwhelming missile orientation of the Soviet Navy of the 1960's.

By the summer of 1967, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov was able to describe the Soviet Navy with pride as follows:

Tens of our submarines and surface ships are constantly located in various regions of the oceans and seas, where they vigilantly serve, safeguarding the state interests of the homeland, protecting the labor of the Soviet people....⁴⁸

46. See above, p. 52.

47. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 31, 1966.

48. Pravda, July 30, 1967.

He also pointed out that the Navy played an important role in "the strengthening of friendship of our people with the peoples of other countries" through friendly visits to various states.⁴⁹ Kasatonov's description of the Navy's role was more direct. "For the first time in its history", he said, "our Navy has in the full sense changed into a long-range offensive arm of the armed forces."⁵⁰ "Shoulder to shoulder with the Strategic Rocket Forces," he went on, "the Soviet Navy has become the most important weapon of the High Command."⁵¹ Here, he was clearly speaking of the Navy's nuclear deterrent and counter-force role.

Kasatonov went on to describe the Navy's growing political role. The technical rearmament of the Navy in recent years, he said, had given the Navy the capability of "fulfilling missions in distant regions of the world oceans which earlier were considered the zone of domination by the navies of the imperialist powers."⁵² As examples of this kind of mission, he cited the visits of the Soviet Navy in the preceding two years to Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, France, Ethiopia, the UAR, Syria, and Algeria. "Ship visits", he observed, "facilitate the development and strengthening of friendly relations between the Soviet people

49. Ibid.

50. "Ha Boevoi Vakhte", Krasnaya Zvezda, July 30, 1967.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

and the peoples of foreign countries, they strengthen the authority and influence of our homeland in the international arena."⁵³ This statement clearly indicates that the Soviet Naval leaders and probably the political leadership are beginning to think in terms of the political influence which can be achieved by the use of a mobile fleet. Kasatonov's article is also interesting, in that he identifies the usefulness of the Navy in terms of its utilisation in time of all-out nuclear war and in terms of the political influence which could result from its use in time of peace. He does not examine the great spectrum of possible military uses of the Navy in between these two extremes. In other words, a discussion of the possible usefulness of the Navy in supporting "wars of national liberation" or taking part in limited wars has yet to appear in the Soviet military press. If a discussion of these aspects of naval power has taken place in the Soviet Union, it has not yet entered the public debate on strategy.

53. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR: SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS

One of the best foundations for any prediction of the way a human organization is likely to act in the future is an examination of its actions in history. This is not always a reliable guide, as our intelligence experts discovered at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis, but it is usually the best guide available. Until very recently, an examination of the history of the Soviet Navy would have led to the conclusion that it was unlikely to play an important role in international politics in the future. Such a conclusion would no longer be a safe one.

Well into the decade of the 1960's, Soviet naval operations were confined for the most part to designated fleet operating areas, or "polygons", located close to shore. Lengthy cruises to distant waters were the exception, rather than the rule, and Soviet seamen seldom saw a foreign port. In 1961, for example, the guided missile cruiser Dzerzhinskii travelled a total of 13,000 miles, a feat for which the commanding officer was very proud.¹ By comparison, it would not be unusual for an American naval vessel to travel this distance in two months.

As a consequence of the limited operating experience of the Soviet Navy, it would be difficult to evaluate it at

1. "Raketchiki Kreisera Dzerzhinskii", Krasnaya Zvezda, February 7, 1962.

the beginning of the decade as a completely combat-ready organization. Since lengthy cruises were rare and unaccustomed ventures, each cruise was planned carefully and meticulously to the smallest detail.² The very unusual nature of such cruises led to thorough preparation. This situation undoubtedly had some good points, because it led to the maximum utilization of each cruise for training benefits. On the other hand, much of such training was wasted because it was not sufficiently repetitive.

The average specialist in the Soviet Navy devoted about one day each week to training in his specialty. Missile specialists, an elite group in the Navy, were given the extraordinary sum of two days a week for training in their specialty.³ It would be difficult to compare this with the situation in the U.S. Navy, but if this includes "on-the-job" training, it does not seem to be enough to achieve a high level of proficiency. The rest of the time is presumably taken up with cleaning and preservation, general military training, and political indoctrination. The latter absorbs an extraordinary amount of each seaman's time and causes widespread resentment, especially among the officer specialists who would rather put the time to what from their standpoint would be more productive use.

The consequence of this limited readiness for Naval

2. "Bol'shomy pokhody - bol'shaya podgotovka: (For a long cruise -great preparation), Krasnaya Zvezda, May 22, 1967.

3. "Raketchiki Flota" (Missilemen of the Fleet), Krasnaya Zvezda, March 10, 1962.

operations in distant waters were dramatically demonstrated in October, 1962, during the Cuban Missile crisis. It is not known whether the Soviet leaders seriously considered sending a surface ship escort with the Soviet cargo ships carrying missiles to Cuba in order to challenge the American quarantine. If this possibility was considered, however, it must have been quickly dismissed. A Naval force accustomed to meticulous planning and preparation for training cruises could hardly be expected to respond so rapidly to meet an operational requirement. Khrushchev was forced to threaten naval retaliation to the quarantine by using his submarines to sink an American ship if a Soviet ship were stopped on the high seas.⁴

Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the submarine is a particularly inappropriate weapon to use for a discrete application of naval power. A surfaced submarine is extremely vulnerable and defenseless. A submerged submarine is invisible and therefore useless for the purpose of demonstrating commitment to a course of action. If the Soviet leaders had wanted to raise the ante in the game of confrontation off the coast of Cuba, a squadron of surface escorts accompanying the Soviet cargo ships would have been more effective. The evidence indicates that this option was closed to the Soviet decision makers due to the lack of readiness of the Soviet surface fleet.

This demonstration of the shortcomings of the surface

4. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 214.

Navy must have strengthened the hand of those for whom Admiral Isakov had spoken when he said, "while there exists a merchant fleet, nothing except a military navy can guarantee its safety of movement along sea routes", and for this purpose "you cannot do without a surface fleet".⁵ Admiral Gorshkov's statement in the wake of the missile crisis that "The Soviet Navy is obliged by the character of its armament of highly maneuverable force and military weapons to be prepared at any moment and at any point on the globe to secure the defense of the interests of our government" probably represents a determination on his part that the Navy never again be tried and found wanting.⁶ He applied this obligation particularly to the submarine force, however.

The Soviet Navy soon set about revamping its training and organization. By February, 1963, Gorshkov was able to report, "The Communist Party and the Soviet government are displaying wise foresight, taking all measures to insure that the armament and organization of our fleet correspond to its growing role in the defense of the country, in the protection of its state interests."⁷ However, he indicated that the main effort in this direction was directed to the end of better equipping the Navy to play an important role in all-out nuclear war. "Proceeding from the positions of our military doctrine, and Soviet Naval thought," he said, "unified views on the role

5. Nedelya, No. 23, June 9, 1962.

6. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 31, 1962.

7. "Bol'shie zadachi", Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5, 1963.

and place of the Navy in conditions of nuclear-missile war have been worked out."⁸

Some indication of what Gorshkov had in mind was given in March, when a group of four Soviet naval Tu-95 aircraft made an overflight over the United States aircraft carrier Constellation 600 miles southwest of Midway.⁹ In June, six Soviet naval Tu-16 Badger aircraft flew near the aircraft carrier Ranger 330 miles east of Japan as she steamed toward the United States.¹⁰ It was to become standard procedure after this for American aircraft carriers in transit to the Sixth and Seventh Fleets to be subjected to overflights by Soviet naval aircraft.

The technology involved in these operations was described by a Soviet naval officer as early as May, 1961. Captain(1st Rank) Lan, writing about the vulnerability of carrier task forces, pointed out that modern radio intelligence can locate a ship's position to within 5-6 percent of the range. "With this accuracy," he commented, "it is possible to direct submarines and shore-based aircraft to intercept the task force."¹¹ Coupling this with contemporary developments in infrared technology, hydroacoustic and radio direction-finding, he claimed, would make possible a strike against a carrier

8. Ibid.

9. New York Times, June 5, 1963.

10. Ibid.

11. V. Lan, "Peretsenka tsennosti" (Reevaluation of the cost), Krasnaya Zvezda, May 24, 1961.

task force of sufficient accuracy to at least seriously reduce its combat readiness.

That these operations were intended in part to demonstrate the vulnerability of aircraft carriers under nuclear warfare conditions is revealed in such statements as that of Admiral Gorshkov who said, "In a series of instances our ships and naval aviation have demonstrated examples of operational and active actions, as a result of which some foreign governments became convinced that they could not consider their aircraft carriers and submarines....invulnerable in the event of war."¹² More to the point, however, was that these operations served as a graphic illustration of the validity of the claims of the spokesmen for naval aviation, who claimed "Our naval missile-carrying aviation is capable of rendering them [carrier task forces] destructive blows without entering their zone of antiair defense".¹³

At the same time, these operations also strengthened the case of Khrushchev against the construction of surface vessels. He told Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labor Party, during a 1963 visit that the Soviet Union was no longer building surface warships because of their vulnerability to missile attack.¹⁴ This appears to have represented wishful thinking on Khrushchev's part, because the surface ship program continued in the Soviet Union. However, the modest character of the

12. "Flot v bol'shom plavanii", Krasnaya Zvezda, March 21, 1964.

13. Major-General (aviation) S. Ruban, "Nad okeanskimi glubiniami" (Over the ocean depths), Krasnaya Zvezda, June 5, 1963.

14. New York Times, June 11, 1963.

building program may indicate that Khrushchev was able to hold the line against a more ambitious program.

As the U.S. Polaris program proceeded, naval officers began expressing more and more concern for the antisubmarine problem. This concern was reflected in the changing pattern of surface ship operations, as well as submarine operations. Not long after the United States began deploying Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean as Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Italy and Turkey, Soviet naval squadrons began to appear more frequently in that sea. By the summer of 1964, Soviet naval units were a frequent sight in the Mediterranean.¹⁵ Often Soviet naval units would steam side by side with American task forces for days at a time.

In the Pacific, beginning in mid-1964, Soviet naval forces began to appear in the Philippine Sea regularly about once a quarter. These small task forces were quite often engaged in exercises associated with antisubmarine warfare. They began to take place on a regular basis not long after a Polaris submarine facility was opened on Guam (at the eastern edge of the Philippine Sea) and Polaris submarines were introduced into the Far East. These operations were followed quite closely by American naval units. Vice Admiral D. K. Yaroshevich, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, admitted that during these operations some Soviet submarines had surfaced near U.S. ships in the Philippine Sea "when they

15. New York Times, July 3, 1964.

had finished their exercises", but denied that they were forced to surface because of American antisubmarine proficiency (as Admiral Hayward, Commander of American Antisubmarine Warfare Forces, Pacific, had claimed).¹⁶ It was not without reason that Admiral Gorshkov called 1964 "the year of the routine long cruise".

Another form of Soviet naval power which had long been familiar to American naval forces also increased its level of activity during 1964. This is the group of intelligence-gathering vessels usually described as intelligence "trawlers". These vessels were at first built on the converted hulls of standard ocean-going fishing trawler design, but have never made any pretence at being fishing boats. Their configuration is quite different from standard fishing trawlers built on the same hull, in that they carry a large array of electronic equipment and specialized antennas. They fly the ensign of the Soviet Naval Hydrographic Service and claim to be "hydrographic vessels". In recent years, they are often found in the company of American carrier task forces. They are also located permanently on station near the Polaris base at Guam, Holy Loch, and Charleston, and since 1964 one has been continually on station at "Point Yankee" observing U.S. Carrier operations off the coast of Viet Nam. The United States has reciprocated with a similar surveillance effort.

All of this activity by a navy accustomed to lengthy

16. "Reklama i deistvitel'nost'", Krasnaya Zvezda, May 13, 1965.

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operations at sea was not undertaken without difficulty, There are repeated reports in the military press of shortcomings in the operational readiness of fleet units. In one example, a ship was notified only a few days in advance that it was to take part in a mission far from shore of importance to the training plan. Despite strenuous efforts by the commanding officer to train his crew adequately for the operation, when the ship arrived on station it was discovered that the ship's specialists were not able to receive the required target data, and the operation was unsatisfactory. The onus for the failure in this case was placed on the staff for not allowing the ship sufficient time for preparation. Without knowing the details, it would be difficult to evaluate the incident, but it seems to graphically demonstrate the general lack of readiness of the Soviet Navy at that time.

These difficulties have by no means been overcome. A recent article complained that whereas in former times the Soviet Navy operated close to shore and seldom went on long voyages, the very unusual nature of these long voyages led to thorough preparation. Now that such voyages are common, insufficient attention is paid to pre-voyage preparation.¹⁸ Other articles complain of the failure of naval commanders to carry out the training plan when they are deployed on op-

17. "Uspekh pokhoda gotovitsia v baze" (Success of a cruise is prepared at the base), Krasnaya Zvezda, April 18, 1963.

18. "Bol'shomy pokhody - bol'shaya podgotovka", Krasnaya Zvezda, March 22, 1967.

erational missions.¹⁹ It is apparent from these articles that the Soviet Navy has not yet been entirely successful in balancing training with operational requirements. This problem was intensified by the decision last year to reduce the period of obligated service of draftees in all services by one year. Admiral Kasatonov described the problem succinctly when he observed, "The period of service of personnel has shortened, but the military preparedness must improve."²⁰

A great deal of attention has been given in recent years to the problem of increasing the mobility and reliability of the submarine force. Even though the submarine was touted as the "main striking force" of the Navy, Soviet submarines had long been plagued with reliability problems. On occasion, it became necessary to tow disabled submarines back to port for repairs.²¹ That significant progress was being made in this direction was indicated by the 1962 cruise of the Leninskii Komsomolets, an early N class submarine, to the north pole.²² Another milestone was the 1967 submerged circumnavigation of the globe by a group of Soviet submarines. Defense Minister Malinovskii announced at the Twenty-Third Party Congress that the number of lengthy cruises by Soviet submarines had increas-

19. Captain(1st Rank) V. Mamchitz, "Boevaya ucheba v pokhode" (Military training on cruise), Krasnaya Zvezda, January 27, 1968.

20. Fleet Admiral V. Kasatonov, "Na morskikh prostorakh-vakh-ta zorkaya" (On the sea spaces - a vigilant watch), Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 3, February, 1968.

21. New York Times, May 29, 1963, p. 8.

22. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 20, 1963.

ed in recent years by five times.²³ Admiral Gorshkov contends that these operations by Soviet submarines are the best demonstration of "the high quality of their mechanisms and systems, the fine training of their seamen, the capability to fulfill complex missions in practically any region of the World oceans."²⁴

As a corollary to the Soviet Navy's increased operational activity, naval units began to call more frequently at foreign ports. In the "year of the routine long cruise", 1964, the Soviet Navy made calls at ports in Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, England, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Syria, and Ethiopia, among others.²⁵ In the next three years, France, the United Arab Republic, and Algeria were added to the list.²⁶

The increasing frequency of Naval visits to ports in Egypt is of particular interest. In September, 1965, a group of destroyers and submarines called at Port Said. In March, 1966, five more ships, including a guided missile cruiser and two submarines, docked at Port Said for a five-day visit.²⁷ In July, Egyptian naval units visited Sevastopol' on the Black Sea, and in August five Soviet naval vessels called at Alex-

23. XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Stenograficheskii Otchet) (Moscow: Politizdat, 2.v., 1966), v. I, p. 413.

24. S. G. Gorshkov, "Nash moguchii okeanskii flot", Pravda, July 30, 1967.

25. Pravda, July 24, 1965.

26. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 30, 1967.

27. New York Times, April 5, 1966.

andria to return the visit.²⁸ In November, five Soviet vessels, including two submarines and a guided missile destroyer visited Algiers.²⁹ Each of these visits included three or four combatant ships accompanied by one or two support ships.

This increased activity in the Mediterranean was accompanied by rumors that the Russians were making an effort to establish bases in Egypt and possibly in Algeria. Such rumors have been a recurrent theme ever since the Russians began playing a more active role in world affairs as early as 1955. Rumors of base agreements accompanied the first aid to Egypt at that time, and were later heard in connection with the granting of aid to Indonesia and Cuba. Such predictions have yet to be borne out. In the Mediterranean, the Soviet Navy has been relying on anchorage areas in international waters for replenishment of fuel and provisions, as well as for minor repairs. Some support operations, however, are facilitated by the use of port facilities. It would have to be said that the privilege of calling at Egyptian and Algerian ports probably eased the task of supporting the ten to twenty ships of the Mediterranean squadron, but the facilities provided are considerably less than would be provided by a naval base.

When the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 increased in intensity, the Soviet Union sent ten additional naval vessels through the Dardanelles to augment the force of fifteen or twenty ves-

28. Ibid., August 8, 1966.

29. Ibid., November 11, 1966.

sels already in the Mediterranean.³⁰ As the crisis opened, the Soviet squadron deployed in the Mediterranean included only one cruiser. Even after this force was augmented, however, it still confronted a vastly superior American Sixth Fleet including three attack aircraft carriers and a number of cruisers. From this standpoint, the Soviet naval units raised more of a diplomatic than a military problem. This action did, however, mark a watershed of sorts in the use of Soviet naval power. For the first time, Soviet naval units were used to demonstrate a Soviet foreign policy commitment during a crisis. The significance of this move was somewhat diluted, however, by the fact that only after it was quite clear that the United States was not going to come to the aid of Israel and after it was clear that Israel was not going to advance beyond Suez did Russian ships again visit Egyptian ports.³¹ A more daring use of naval visits for the purpose of demonstrating Soviet commitment to Egypt took place in October following the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath by Egyptian boats armed with the Russian Styx missile.³² In this case, the Soviet presence may well have averted an attack on Suez by Israeli forces.

Whether Soviet political leaders anticipated the possible political results of their increased operational activity in the Mediterranean is not clear. Gorshkov and other naval

30. New York Times, May 31, 1967.

31. Ibid., July 10, 1967.

32. Ibid., October 26, 1967.

spokesmen had stressed the utility of "friendly" visits to other countries since at least 1965. It was only after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, however, that Admiral Kasatonov described these activities in terms indicating a sharp awareness of the political uses of the fleet. Writing for the military press on Navy Day, 1967, he said: "ship visits facilitate the development and strengthening of friendly relations between the Soviet people and the peoples of foreign countries, and they strengthen the authority and influence of our homeland in the international arena."³³

33. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 30, 1967. (Emphasis mine).

CHAPTER FIVE: SOVIET NAVAL POWER - AN EVALUATION

Soviet naval leaders claim to have put to an end the sole domination of the oceans of the world by the traditional naval powers, most importantly by the United States. There is certainly a great deal of evidence to support this contention. For the first time in history, the Soviet Union has become a real sea power. The significance of this power, however, varies greatly with various types of encounter at sea. Although the Soviet Navy is undoubtedly powerful in many respects, it suffers from serious shortcomings.

In the first place, from the standpoint of the design of its ships, the Soviet Navy is not a balanced force by comparison with western navies. The most significant material shortcoming of the Soviet force is its lack of an aircraft carrier capability. The aircraft carrier in the hands of western navies has proven to be an extremely flexible weapons system. An aircraft carrier is essentially a highly mobile, fully equipped modern airfield capable of launching aircraft with a strategic nuclear capability, supersonic interceptors and attack aircraft, as well as antisubmarine aircraft. Such a weapon is capable of reacting rapidly and effectively to meet the whole spectrum of possible uses of naval power, from the showing of the flag for diplomatic purposes, through limited demonstrations of force and limited warfare to strategic nuclear war. It is capable of providing close air support for troops located

far beyond hostile shores. Its capability of establishing local air superiority is indispensable for the purposes of facilitating any amphibious attack upon a hostile shore.

At the same time, despite repeated Soviet claims of the vulnerability of carrier task forces, an attack aircraft carrier has a highly advanced and powerful capability of protecting itself against air attack by hostile forces. For defense against submarines, it depends on the ASW capability of its escort vessels, as well as upon its own speed and maneuverability. Soviet confidence in their ability to detect and destroy carrier task forces seems to rely heavily on the use of radio intelligence and radio direction-finding, as discussed in Captain Lan's article.¹ This confidence may be premature. Under wartime conditions it is unlikely that a carrier task force would be as indiscriminate in its emission of radio signals as it is in times of peace. They also place a great deal of reliance on the fact that they can launch an airborne missile against a carrier from beyond the carrier's air defense zone. It is difficult to imagine how they will achieve sufficient certainty of identification from this distance to enable them to launch a homing missile.

The lack of an aircraft carrier in the Soviet Navy still prevents them from establishing local air superiority beyond interceptor range from any airbases on land which might be made available to them. This limitation precludes the realis-

1. See above, p. 71.

tic contemplation of amphibious operations against a hostile shore. This is one reason why it seems at this point unlikely that the two helicopter carriers recently commissioned in the Soviet Navy are intended for use as amphibious assault carriers. Another factor which supports this scepticism is that three such ships (a third is reportedly under construction)² would seem to be an inordinately large number to support the limited force of 6,000 naval infantry now in existence.

The reasons for the reorganization of the naval infantry in 1964 are obscure. The force is too small to be of any significance in providing the Soviet Union with a capacity to leap-frog their land perimeter and project their power abroad by the use of amphibious warfare. Much greater resources would have to be invested in both equipment and personnel, including the establishment of a fixed-wing aircraft carrier capability in order to realize any serious capacity for amphibious assault beyond contiguous waters. It is possible that operations could be undertaken in the eastern Mediterranean using airbases in Egypt, but the continued availability of such bases rests on a very tenuous political basis.

Soviet military doctrine as expressed in various sources calls for the eventual occupation of enemy home territory in order to consolidate victory in the event of a world war.³ Al-

2. New York Times, February 14, 1968.

3. See, for example, V. D. Sokolovskii (ed.), Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 423.

though the published discussion of how this might be done is sketchy at best, it may be that the small naval infantry force reorganized in 1964 and the modest amphibious lift capability in existence in the Soviet fleet is a tribute to this doctrine. Amphibious training in river and lake crossing techniques is also provided the Soviet Army, and much of the equipment and training of the naval amphibious forces and naval infantry would be applicable to this end. However, as has already been pointed out, the concept of amphibious operations against hostile territory in an area where the attacking forces lack the capability of establishing local air superiority is a suicidal one. For this reason, it seems most likely from a rational standpoint that the naval infantry is intended for amphibious operations in conjunction with theater warfare in Europe and Asia in areas contiguous to the Soviet Union in the event of war, rather than for any amphibious assaults beyond the oceans.

Soviet naval and political leaders continue to describe the main striking force of the Soviet Navy as the nuclear-powered submarine. A glance at Table I shows that, without a doubt, the submarine looms large in Soviet plans. The difficulty with the submarine from the standpoint of a flexible use of naval power, is that the submarine is useless in time of peace or in time of non-belligerent crisis. This point should have been clearly demonstrated by the events of the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, strangely enough, the reaction of naval leaders following the crisis was to give even more attention to the development of the submarine. Writing in 1964,

one naval officer observed that the Soviet Navy at the present stage had become "mainly a submarine fleet, the basis of which is the atomic submarine, armed with missiles and torpedoes with nuclear warheads".⁴ He attributed the dominant position of the submarine to its capability of operating successfully against aircraft carriers and missile-carrying surface ships, enemy submarines, and shore targets. These ideas on the usefulness of the submarine have recurred with monotonous regularity in the Soviet military press. It is clear from such passages that the contemplated role of the submarine can only be fulfilled in time of war. In fact, it is difficult to think of any scenario short of general war either of the World War II variety, or all-out nuclear war, in which the submarine would have any useful role.

Following Khrushchev's speech of January, 1961, some naval spokesmen, such as Admiral Isakov, defended the role of the surface ship against its most extreme detractors, and others defended the role of the aircraft in naval affairs. After about 1963, these voices of mild dissent were largely quiet. It would appear that their objections had been satisfactorily met by continuing to construct new ships and missile-armed aircraft. The prestige of both surface ships and aircraft increased after 1963, but in each case the important role acknowledged was the role of countering American nuclear

4. Captain (2nd Rank) A. V. Basov in Boevoi Put' Sovetskogo Voenno - Morskogo Flota (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 598.

attack, or "counterforce", and it was stated that the reason they now could play an important role in modern conditions was that they now also carried missiles.

Beginning in 1963, and even more sharply in 1964, the Soviet Navy began to break out of the confines of the continuous seas and operations areas and to move into the open ocean spaces. As one naval writer put it,

During the Great Fatherland War [World War II] fleet actions took place basically in the areas close to shore and were conducted for the most part in operational and tactical cooperation with the Army. Now, taking into account the intentions of the imperialist aggressors, and the place given to their navies in the plan of nuclear aggression against the socialist countries, the Soviet Navy must be prepared to answer them with crushing blows at naval objectives on the entire territory of the World ocean.⁵

Thus, according to the Soviet account, the reason for moving the fleet out into the open sea was for purpose of defending against western naval forces in the event of a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Events of 1963 and 1964 would seem to bear this out. The naval air arm began in 1963 to make routine overflights of United States carrier forces in transit to the Sixth and Seventh fleets. Early in 1964, after the United States began deploying Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviet Navy began deploying units to the area. Much of this effort would appear to be directed toward developing an antisubmarine warfare capability in order to counter American Polaris forces, and a great deal of the Soviet

5. Ibid., p. 596.

effort in the Mediterranean has also been given to following the movements and operations of American aircraft carriers.

In a sense, the increased range of naval weapons such as Polaris and carrier aviation forced the Soviet Navy into this role. If the range of opposing naval weapons directed against shore targets increased, then the Soviet Navy had to move out of the confines of contiguous waters in order to meet the threat at sea instead of relying on air and missile defense. In another sense, this is a strange development.

Khrushchev in 1960 adopted a posture somewhat similar to the "massive retaliation" doctrine of the United States in the Eisenhower era. His explanation was that the imperialist powers would never attack the Soviet Union now because the latter had such a commanding lead in nuclear strategic power. In other words, he was relying on deterrence to avoid a nuclear war. It was just at this time, however, that the Navy began to find a real defensive role for itself in the event of nuclear attack.

This defensive effort was directed against carrier strike forces and Polaris submarines. The Polaris threat was a new one but the carrier threat had long existed, and the Soviet Navy had done little of an effective nature in the 1950's to counter it. Now, just when the carrier's strategic role was beginning to decline, the Navy began to develop effective means to counter it. A partial explanation for this state of affairs is to be found in the time lag between a change in the military doctrine by one side and the subsequent recognition of the im-

plications by the other side. This time lag, coupled with the time required to construct new weapons systems often means that the two sides are facing each other with imbalanced forces. But this does not entirely explain the failure of the Soviet Navy in the 1950's to develop the operational experience necessary to meet the carrier threat on the high seas.

As we have seen, the political fortunes of the Soviet Navy were on the rise in the mid-1960's. It would be tempting, in retrospect, to identify the Cuban missile crisis as the great watershed in the development of the Soviet Navy. Such a conclusion would not be entirely correct. The submarine fleet had achieved great prestige by 1961. Speaking at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev commented,

The construction of the Soviet submarine fleet is proceeding successfully. Our enemies are building a submarine fleet armed with ballistic missiles. We are arming our fleet with both ballistic and homing missiles. Conditions oblige us to do this. Our enemies in the opposing military blocs are preparing to bombard the territory of our country as well as the socialist countries from submarines. We are prepared to answer them, firing at their targets on the sea as well as on the land.⁶

In May, 1962, Khrushchev visited Leningrad and spoke to the shipbuilders and seamen of the Baltic Fleet on the high quality of the new ships. "In the past", he said, "we have often criticized our military comrades for deficiencies in the develop-

6. N. S. Khrushchev, Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS S'ezdy KPSS, (Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress of the CPSU), (Moscow: Politizdat, 1961) p. 43.

ment of the Navy, and demanded that it be improved. And this criticism was not in vain. What I have seen here is the kind of ships that fully answer the modern development of the Navy and the modern development of military science and technology." ⁷ Khrushchev's July visit to the Northern Fleet where he observed training exercises, including the submerged firing of a ballistic missile, provided further confirmation of the increased interest by political leaders in the potential of the Navy.

The Cuban missile crisis, as we have also seen, did not bring about a reevaluation of the role of the submarine or the potentialities of the Navy as a means of projecting Soviet power and influence abroad under circumstances of confrontation short of war. The crisis did apparently spur the Navy to greater efforts to achieve operational readiness and a higher mobility. These measures were at first directed at the problem of defense in nuclear war against the naval nuclear attack forces of the western navies. They have been partially successful in this venture, but are still deficient in logistical support by comparison with the NATO navies.

It is in the area of mobility that the post-Cuban Soviet Navy is most clearly distinguishable from that of the pre-Cuba period. It appears that as a result of their greater mobility the Soviet leaders discovered almost by chance the political usefulness of a mobile fleet under circumstances

7. Pravda, May 11, 1962.

short of war. In the past two or three years, visits by Soviet Naval vessels to foreign ports have been used for obviously political purposes. Such use of the fleet has been most intense in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. It may be that the beneficial results of the Soviet naval deployment to the Mediterranean in connection with the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 exceeded the anticipation of the Soviet political leaders themselves. There is no indication that such use of the Navy was seriously contemplated by the leadership in the earlier period. Whether such use was contemplated or not, the Soviet Navy in 1962 and 1963 was not in a sufficiently high condition of operational readiness to execute such missions.

Thus it appears that the Soviet policy of utilizing its naval forces to influence events in the Eastern Mediterranean in the summer of 1967 was an outcome of the interaction of the crisis situation and the option of using mobile naval power for this purpose, rather than a policy which had long been planned and for which the groundwork had been carefully laid. When the Soviet government was faced in May with the necessity of demonstrating its solidarity with the Arab countries rather than losing its political influence in the area, the option of a naval demonstration appeared to be a live one. It had the advantage of being highly visible without being provocative or dangerous, whereas a deployment of Soviet troops to Egyptian soil would have been both provocative and dangerous. The manner in which the demonstration was conducted indicates that

the Russians were carefully avoiding a dangerous confrontation with the United States or even with Israel.

The political role of the Soviet Navy in the struggle over allocation of resources in the Soviet Union remains somewhat obscure. Participation by naval officers in the strategic debate both before and after the fall of Khrushchev has been minimal. Early in the decade, a few spokesmen expressed dissatisfaction with the preeminent position of the submarine when it appeared as if this policy might lead to the almost total eclipse of the surface navy and naval aviation. Since their demands have been largely met, however, there has been almost a universal expression of deep satisfaction by naval leaders with their share of the resource allocation. A purely rational explanation of the growing influence of the Navy in terms of the global strategic balance, as we have seen, is not a sufficient explanation for many features of the current structure of the Navy.

In order to achieve such a relatively complete satisfaction of its desires, the Navy must have been able to form alliances with other influential elements in the Soviet political arena. It is not clear just who these elements are, but certain probable candidates stand out from the evidence. One such element is the growing Soviet Merchant Marine. This fleet has undergone extremely rapid growth since 1953, growing from 1,392,000 tons in 1953 to 7,455,00 in 1965.⁸ In recent years

8. L. W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p. 182.

the association between the merchant and naval fleets has been quite clearly made.⁹ Another element which has probably supported the Navy's position is that of the managerial group associated with the missile and electronic industries. Most important, perhaps, has been the notably good relationship between the Navy and the Party in recent years. Nearly 90 percent of the personnel of the Navy belong either to the Party or to the Komsomol.¹⁰ Unlike the Army, the Navy has not challenged the leadership of the Party. Within the top leadership of the Party there is insufficient evidence to ascertain just who are the Navy's patrons.

There is a notable lack of discussion in the Soviet military press of the possibility of Soviet forces taking part in "local wars". This is not surprising, since the Soviet leadership has never rescinded the formulation of Khrushchev that such wars are to be avoided because of the danger of escalation to general nuclear war. There is some fear in the United States that recent developments in the Soviet Navy indicate that they "plan to put themselves in a position where they could, if necessary, land forces to support friendly governments against attempted coups d'etat as the U.S.A. and Britain did for the Lebanese and Jordanian regimes a decade ago."¹¹ Although such fears are legitimate, they are probably greatly exaggerated. There is little evidence to support the existence

10. Boevoi Put' Sovetsko Voenno-Morskogo Flota, p. 607.

11. C. L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: The Maltese Cross:", The New York Times, February 23, 1968.

of such a plan. If the Russian naval or political leaders were planning for the possibility of such operations, it seems unlikely that the question of limited war would be as little discussed in the military press as it currently is.

The danger of Soviet "adventurism", if there is such a danger, is not from carefully planned and executed actions in support of client governments, but rather from possible miscalculations as to the danger involved in an action. With the possible exception of the Cuban missile crisis, the Russians have always been careful to avoid a direct confrontation of the United States at sea. With all of the increased Soviet naval activity, including visits to foreign ports, it seems significant that naval excursions in the Pacific have been to the Philippine Sea, and not to the South China Sea. No Soviet naval ship has visited a North Vietnamese port since the outbreak of war in the north. Although naval leaders have given some attention to the political uses of naval power in the last year, their attention still seems to be directed at the peacetime occasions for such use. For the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that the Soviet government will utilize its growing sea arsenal to support political action in opposition to what is perceived by them to be an important national interest of the United States. Whatever the term "defense of the state interests" means to the leaders of the Soviet Union, it can be said with reasonable assurance that it does not mean taking any undue risk of war with the United States. This has so far been true even in the case of so-call-

ed "wars of national-liberation". Khrushchev and his successors have talked loudly about supporting national-liberation wars, but when these pronouncements have been put to the test, they have been careful to render assistance in forms which do not risk the unpredictable result of a widening war.

What, then, is the significance of the growing role of the Soviet Navy for the future? It is always rash to make predictions, but on the basis of the evidence examined here, it seems possible to suggest that it is most likely that the Russian naval strategists will continue to concentrate on the development of naval weapons with what is essentially a "counterforce" role, whether in ASW or anti-carrier operations. As presently conceived, the current revival of the naval infantry and increased amphibious capability also seems to be designed for use in general warfare conditions. While general war will probably continue to be the primary concern of the Soviet Navy as well as the rest of their armed forces, the increased mobility and readiness of the Soviet fleet has already reaped some political dividends in the Middle East and possibly off Korea in the Pueblo incident. As the options of using naval power for political ends become more apparent and better understood by both naval and political leaders, the possibility of the Navy being used for these purposes will increase. It is here that the situation is fraught with the most danger, because the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, among other things, that no matter how cautious the Soviet leaders have been in the past, and no matter how conscious they are of the

"balance of forces", they can and do make mistakes about what the United States will perceive as a vital national interest. In the future, the possibilities for such miscalculations on the high seas will increase.

On the whole, the Soviet Navy is a potent force, second only to the United States Navy. It is, however, for various reasons set forth here, a poor second. In the event of general war, it could inflict costly damage to United States forces, but probably not decisive damage. It is poorly prepared and equipped for limited or local warfare. It has become, however, more active recently as an instrument of political influence. This is the area currently subject to the most uncertainties and where the possibility of a direct Soviet-American confrontation is most apparent, although such a confrontation would very likely result not from a calculated move, but rather from a miscalculation. It is for such an eventuality that American naval thinking should be prepared.

TABLE I

GROWTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY FROM 1960 to 1967¹

Ship Type	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1967(3)
Submarines	458	420	426	446	423	393	380
Conventional	450	420	410	426	407	353	357
SSB	10(2)	18(2)	29(2)	20	20	35	35(2)
SSG			20(2)			14(2)	24
Nuclear	6(2)	6(2)	16	20	16	40	50
SSBN			8	10	8	13(2)	13(2)
SSGN			4	4	2	15(2)	25(2)
Cruisers	28	25	20(3)	23	22	21	18
Sverdlov class	17	17	14(3)	15	14	14	12
Older classes	11	8(2)	6(3)	8	8	7	6
Destroyers	149	160	164	164	153	147	130
Kresta-class*							5(2)
Kynda-class*			2	2	4	4(2)	4
Krupny-class*		5	8	8	8	8	10
Kashin-class*						6	9
Kildin-class		6(2)	5	5	6	6(2)	6
Kotlin-class	40(2)	40	40	40	30	30(2)	30
Tallin-class	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Skory-class	75	75	75	75	75	65	55(2)
Older classes	33(2)	33(2)	33	33	29	27	0(2)
Escorts (ocean)	103	92	99	99	99	90	92
Escorts (coastal)	208	208	306	316	256	300(3)	270
Minesweepers (ocean)	184	210	270	261	241	240	150
Minesweepers (Coastal)	400	200	300	250	200	240	150
Missile Patrol Boats			110(2)		50	70	100
Fast Patrol Boats	1000	1000	1000	1000	800	370	400
Landing Ships	44	14(2)	14(2)				24(4)

1. Estimates from Veyers Flottentaschenbuch for the year of publication unless otherwise indicated.
 2. Estimate from Janes Fighting Ships
 3. Estimate from Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance
 4. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy, p. 179.
- *These classes are described in the Soviet press as "missile cruisers".

TABLE II

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET SUBMARINES BUILT SINCE WWII

Class	Years built		Displacement	Speed	Weapons	Cruising Range
Nuclear H-Class	1961-?	10	3500/4000	25 kts	3 Sark Ballistic missiles* 6 torpedo tubes	
E-2 Class	1964-?	8	4500/5500	25 kts	8 Shaddock cruise missiles 6 torpedo tubes	
E-1 Class	1962-63	2	4000/5000	25 kts	6 Shaddock cruise missiles 2 torpedo tubes	
N Class	1960-?	10	3500/4000	20/30	6 torpedo tubes	
Conventional G Class	1958-?	25	2250/2700	17/16	3 Sark Ballistic missiles 10 Torpedo tubes	22,000
Z Conver- sion	1958-?	10	2000/2500	18/15	2 Sark Ballistic missiles 6 Torpedo tubes	13,000
J Class	1962-?	2	1800/2200	15/13	4 Shaddock cruise missiles 6 Torpedo tubes	15,000
W Conver- sion	1961-63	12	1300/1800	16/14	4 Shaddock cruise missiles 6 Torpedo tubes	13,000
W Conver- sion	1959-60	2	1100/1600	17/15	1 or 2 Shaddock missiles 4 Torpedo tubes	13,000
F Class	1959-?	25	2000/2500	20/15	10 Torpedo tubes	20,000
Z Class	1951-60	30	1900/2900	13/15	8 Torpedo tubes, mines	20,000
R Class	1959-62	12	1100/1600	18/15	6 Torpedo tubes	13,000
W Class	1950-52	155	1100/1600	17/15	6 Torpedo tubes, mines	13,000
Q Class	1954-60	40	650/740	16/13	4 Torpedo tubes	7,000
MV Class	1944-52	10	350/420	13/10	2 Torpedo tubes	4,000

TABLE III

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET SURFACE COMBATANTS BUILT SINCE WWII

Class	Years built	No.	Displacement	Speed	Weapons	Range
Cruiser Sverdlov	1951-56	14	15,450	34 kts	12-6" guns, 12-4", 16-37mm, 10 torpedo tubes, 200 miles	4000
Destroyers Kresta class	1965-?	5?		35	2-Shaddock SSM, 2 Goa SAM, 4 ASW launchers, 2 twin torpedo launchers 4-57mm guns, 1 helo	
Kashin	1962-?	6	3,300	37	4-75mm guns, 2 Goa SAM, 5 torpedo tubes, 4 ASW launchers	
Kynda	1961-?	4	4,300	35	2- quad shaddock SSM, 1 twin Goa SAM, 4-75mm guns, 5 torpe- do tubes, 2 ASW launchers	
Krupny	1958-?	8	3,650	34.5	2 Strela SSM, 16-45mm guns 6 torpedo tubes, 2 ASW launchers	
Kildin	1957-?	4	3,000	35	1 Strela SSM, 16-45mm guns, 6 torpedo tubes, 2 ASW launchers	
Kotlin	1955-60	25	3,200	36	4-5.1" guns, 16-45mm guns, 10 torpedo tubes, 2 ASW launchers, 80 mines	
Tallinn	1954	1	3,200	38	4-5.1" Guns, 16-45mm guns, 10 torpedo tubes, 2 ASW launchers, 70 mines	
Skory	1949-54	65	2,300	36	4-5.1" guns, 2-85mm guns, 7-37mm guns, 10 torpedo tubes, 2 DC launchers, 80 mines	

TABLE IV

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET NAVAL MISSILES

NATO Designation	Type	Speed (mach)	Range	Classes of Vessels
Sark	Ballistic SSM	3-5	870	G and Z-class submarines
Sorb	Ballistic SSM u/w launch	-	870- 1000	H-class, possibly some modernized G-class
Goa	SAM	2.5	10/12	Destroyers Kresta, Kashin, and Kotlin SAM conversion
Strela	Cruise SSM	1.2	50/96	Kildin, Kruony class
Styx	Cruise SSM	2.0	11.0	Romax, Osa class guided missile patrol boats
Shaddock	Cruise SSM	2.5	300?	Kynda class destroyer, J, E, and U class submarines

Source: Weyers Flottentaschenbuch 1966/67, (Munich: J.F. Lehmann, 1967), p. 372.

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